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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
As
liberal

New

the

order,

predecessors.

Russia proceeds on

Western-style legal

The changes made

its

post-communist path towards the attainment of

institutions

increasingly

replace

their

communist

to the Russian legal system during the past
decade have

been both fundamental and far-reaching. They include the
passage of

legislation

and

provide a framework for the creation of private legal entities and for
the carrying out of

commercial transactions.

Institutions

commonplace

in

Western industrialized market

economies have been created, such as commissions dealing with
securities.

long.

As

To be

sure, a full listing

antitrust,

bankruptcy and

of the reforms thus undertaken would be prohibitively

these developments continue, the Russian government

is

taking up the role of

chief reformer pushing the agenda of restructuring by proposing sets of norms premised

on

liberal values.

building of a

However, even though major

modem

pervasive. Indicative

restraint

is

steps

have been undertaken towards the

institutional infrastructure, deficiencies in created devices are

the tendency for Russian entrepreneurs to exercise conspicuous

towards recently legislated concepts. Entrepreneurs cling

strategies

that

circumvent

official

to defensive business

policy beyond the reach of legal accountability.'

Appropriated strategies range from the revitalization of Soviet trading networks to
straightforward criminal activities.

An

emerging

anti-legal subculture

is

attested,

which

See, for example, Hendley, Kathryn and Cheryl Gray. 1997. "Developing Commercial Law in
Transition Economies: Examples from Hungary and Russia," in The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in
*

Russia, pp. 139-165.
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supplants official policy with

illicit

business practice?

The formation of shadowy

control

structures antithetical to free market institutions
calls into question the capacity of the

Russian polity to undergo transformation

in the direction

of a democratic and law-

governed market economy.

What
state

are the institutional reasons for this type of apparently low
transformative

capacity?

The range of possible

explication ranges from technical approaches

focusing on the dysfunctional state of law enforcement agencies to more comprehensive

accounts of state-societal relations.^ Within the

approach

is

latter

stream of theorizing, a popular

to characterize transitional processes in terms of traditional Russian state

authority.'* In these accounts, deficiencies in

outcome optimization have been ascribed

the autocratic style of politics under President Boris Yeltsin.

study to examine the

reform

politics.

latter

It is

to

the goal of the present

suggestion by inquiring into the institutional bases of Russian

Accordingly, the question

is

raised as to

what extent the Yeltsin

Presidency did in effect duplicate culturally established patterns of autocratic governance

in the coordination

how

and control of economic reform policy? In addition, the question of

autocratic-style governance

namely

to design

would

and implement

infringe

upon the principled purpose of reform,

liberal types of

economic order

is

addressed. In this

respect, the present study proceeds along the hypothetical base line that there

^

is

in fact a

See, for example, Volkov, Vadim. 1999. "Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia,"

Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.5, pp.74 1-754.
^

State:

See, for example, Brovkin, Vladimir. 1998. "Fragmentation of Authority and Privatization of the

From Gorbachev

to Yeltsin," Demokratizatsiya,

Summer, pp.504-517.

Washington. DC:
See, for example, Shevtsova, Lilia. 1999. Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality.
Degradation of
the
and
Superpresidentialism
Deception:
Brookings; Fish, M. Steven. 2000. "The Executive
“

Russian Politics," in Building the Russian State, pp. 177-192.
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structural correlation

to transform

between the variables of

embedded

To examine

other.

To

arrangement and the capacity

social behaviors.

these issues this study engages in a comparative analysis of the two

regimes in question, the

on the

institutional

Romanov

dynasty, on the one hand, and the Yeltsin Presidency,

analyze the extent of convergence, the study focuses on institutional

variables governing participation in policy choice. Structural features

this process

deemed

relevant to

extend to both organizational dimensions of government, inter-branch and

interface. In this

way

specified categories emerge

analyzing corporate law reform.

encountered in

As

more

clearly within the process of

the ensuing discussion will

this context substantial obstacles to formulating

make

clear, both periods

and conveying a coherent

corporate governance regime upon the sociological field of transformation. The discourse

will begin

by discussing

the theoretical underpinnings of institutional development.

Utilizing an engineer-like perspective, inquiry

theory. Particular attention

is

is

made

into the strands of institutional

paid to the issues of participation and interaction in order to

present an ideal-typical model of institutional development on the basis of which the
analysis of the Russian case will be pursued.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS: THE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
Making an

inquiry into the concept of institutions might
be best described in

terms of the metaphorical undertaking of opening the
"black box." By examining the
pertaining research literature,

it

becomes obvious

been designed to provide answers
institutions do,

disclosing the

and

how

to

the

that multiple theoretical styles

question of what institutions are, what

they originate and change. So

locked up" subject matter

have

is

still

far, it

appears that the project of

unfolding since

theoretical styles surface along the process. Accordingly,

much

new

variables and

of the academic debate

focuses on the meta-question of which methodological approach might unveil the tectonic

laws of institutions. Neo-traditional or "soft" styles contend in
"hard" styles of theorizing.^

this

way with

behavioral or

The behavioral approach, however, somewhat dominates

the

scenery. Neo-traditional approaches are dismissed as "soft story-telling" while behavioral

styles of theorizing, utilizing the methodological basis of rational choice theory, claim to

provide

institutional

analysis

behavioral styles derives from

with

its

universal

laws.

The

universahstic

distinctive methodological approach that, as such,

widely considered incompatible with previous modes of inquiry. While
studies usually

presumed an order based on macro-level processes

political system, or the like;

^

For a

Choice Theory:

critical

ambition

of

is

"traditional"

as culture, history, the

contending behavioral styles put an emphasis on micro-level

overview, see Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational
Yale University Press;

A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven:

Rothstein, Bo. 1996. "Political Institutions:

An

Overview," in

A New Handbook of Political Science,
New

pp.133-166; Taylor, Rosemary C. and Peter A. Hall. 1996. "Political Science and the Three
Institutionalisms," Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, pp.936-957.
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processes of strategic action.

As

a result, distinctive and eventually mutually
exclusive

aspects of institutional "realities" get specified ranging
from descriptive to explanatory
levels of analysis.

The academic community,

so

it

seems, has been more successful

in

laying out a variety of methodological routes leading to
the study of institutional

phenomena,

rather than producing an empirically validated outcome. In
contemplating the

logic of contending theoretical styles, the question,

better

key regarding the description,

which approach might deliver

explanation,

even prediction of

or

the

modem

institutions, is still open.

The following discourse aims
institutional analysis.

The inquiry

to

shed some light onto the dominant strands of

differentiates, following the suggestion of Taylor

and

Hall,^ into rational-calculative, normative-cultural, and eclectic styles of institutional

The study concentrates

analysis.

commonly
style will

in this respect

on the

latter theoretical

stream that

is

referred to as the historical variant of institutional analysis. This theoretical

be examined according to

institutional effects,

schemes of

capacity to provide definitions, descriptions of

its

and explanations of

institutional effects,

it

is

institutional origin

noted, often

fall

institutions are usually defined in terms of their effects

and change. Definitions and

into the

same category

since

on human behavior.

Eclectic Styles

One of

the seminal texts striving to bridge interdisciphnary barriers has in this

respect been rendered by Douglass North's (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change,

Economic Performance,

*

Taylor

& Hall,

a distinguished student of

1996.
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economic

history,

which

and

integrates

culturally conditioned

modes of behavior

The reconstruction of

this

into a

framework of

rational decision-making.

approach will be amended with insights deriving
from another

seminal text concerning commercial law institutions,
as rendered by

Max

Weber’s

(

1954 )

Economy and Society J
The

theory.*

starting point of this style of theorizing represents
the modification of the

micro-foundations of rational choice

*

This step occurs on the basis of empirical

data provided by cognitive psychology, whereby

demonstrated that the behavioral

it is

context of strategic action underlies the impact of incomplete knowledge
and limited

computational capacities. Strategic actors, contrary to rational choice assumptions,
are
described as computing information pertinent to choice incompletely and normatively
biased, instead of reaching decisions instantaneously. Consequently, a gap, labeled

gap" in the technical jargon,

is

found to penetrate the

field

of

human

action,

"CD

which

discriminates between the competence [C] of the agent in deciphering problems, and the
difficulty [D] in selecting the

most preferred

alternative.^

unfolds that the objective situation of choice and

’

edited

subjective representation in the

This study utilizes the annotated and selective version of Max Weber's Economy and Society

Max

by

its

The epistemological dilemma

Rheinstein

who

focuses on the legal aspects of Weber's

text.

The

title

of the edited version

Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. 1954. Edited with introduction and
by Max Rheinstein. NY Simon and Schuster. Rather than list the name of the editor

accordingly reads:
annotations

:

(Rheinstein), this paper quotes the original author (Weber) in order to simplify the quotation process.

*

Rational choice theory pictures

human

actors as strategic agents

according to the overwhelming imperative of self-interested

utility

who

structure their agency

maximization. Utility functions are

defined in terms of individually perceived preferences, which are presumed to be stable, transitive,
exogenous to choice, and egoistic in bias. — Picturing human nature as intrinsically egoistic has sparked off

a flurry of critical literature showing discomfort with these kinds of "reductionist" (Peters, 1996, pp.216f)
assumptions. The specific variations of these critics are, however, beyond the scope of this inquiry. For
further details concerning the debate about the behavioralist assumptions of rational choice theories see D.

Green and Shapiro (1994).
See Ronald Heiner. 1983. "The Origins of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review,
Vol.73, pp.560-595, quoted in North 1990, pp.23f.
®
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decision-maker's

mind

are not identical. Accordingly, the
proposition

have to distinguish between the
Culture

framework

for

IS

entering

the

that

"we"

world and the decision-maker's perception of it.*®

equation by providing a language-based conceptual

encoding and interpreting the information

By drawing upon

the brain.

real

made

is

evolutionary theories,

it is

that the senses are presenting to

posited that the organization of

knowledge, values and other factors influencing behavior
inheritance. Culture itself is defined as the

is

contingent upon cultural

transmission from one generation to the next,

via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that
influence
behavior."**

procedural

Within

and

this

normative

context,

"culture"

concepts

denotes

become

that

a

multifaceted

effective

in

the

composite

framework of

institutional analysis. Procedural concepts include the notion of "cultural processing"

"social

transmission;"

whereas

"behavioral

norms"

and

codes"

"internal

of

and

describe

normative aspects of "culture."*^

Due

to the theoretical challenge

posed by the event of

CD

gaps, the inquiry

focuses on procedural concepts of culture and particularly the concept of "cultural

processing"*^ in order to design an integrative approach towards institutional analysis.

Cultural processing of information signifies the central

modus operand!

for encoding

and

North, 1990, pp.23ff.

R.

Boyd and

P.J.

Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago; University

of Chicago Press, p.2, quoted in North, 1990, p.37.

Normative concepts of culture comprise a composite of culturally embedded "informal

rules

and abstract value-sets. Informal rules consist of "modifications" of formal rules, socially sanctioned
"behavioral norms" and internally enforced "codes of conduct" (see definition below in section formal and
informal rules").

As a result, informal

cultural heritage,

whereas culture

rules, like abstract values, constitute

itself

does not merely consist of informal

North, 1990, p.44.
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an integral part of a society’s
rules.

interpreting information in the

human

brain and thus renders the constitutive

momentum

m the creation of mental constructs. Culture endows the individual agent with a
based conceptual framework within which to organize,

The capacity

to

communicate with

related to cultural

utilize,

language-

and process information.

the world and to participate in exchange situation

endowments. The formula of

"cultural processing"

is

subsumes the

condition that decision-making proceeds on the basis of subjective
mental constructs,

which

are subject to culturally derived scripts. Cultural processing of
information then

influences the structure of institutional entities since institutions are constructs
of the

human mind.
and

utilize

In this way,

it is

concluded, "culture defines the

information and hence

may

affect the

way

way

individuals process

institutional

constraints

get

specified."

It

is

noticed that this perspective on institutional development aligns cultural

styles of institutional analysis

by emphasizing procedural aspects of human existence

the description and explanation of institutional constraints.

that

meaning and

identity are conditioned

sure, cultural styles of analysis put

identities

The common denominator

primacy on the

political that

manages meanings and
whereas North puts

primacy on cultural processing of information. Both approaches, however,
concepts

of

information

is

by procedural concepts of information. To be

through "the symbolism of the decision-making process,"

procedural

in

to

provide

contending

accounts

utilize

of

the

North, 1990, p.42.

March, James G. and Johan P Olsen. 1984. "The

New Institutionalism:

Political Life," American Political Science Review, Vol.78, pp.734-749, here

8

at

Organizational Factors in

page 49.

interrelationship of mental constructs, preferences,
and institutional constraints.
cultural pattern

of causation, however,

individual freedom since

it

is

more sympathetic towards

the

The

ideals

of

does not consider cultural homogeneity or the technique
of

political indoctrination as imperative.

On

the contrary. North renders a less rigid pattern

of causation by leaving the exact nature of the transmission mechanism
that links cultural
macro-level processes
concedes:

"We

The

still

with

are a long

micro-level

mental

way from having any

constructs

neat models of cultural evolution."*^

however, aligns the perspective of rational-calculative

inquiry,

demonstrating that institutions are the product of utihty-maximizing
actors, confronting the event of

rational

CD

in response to both:

problems to be solved and the problem-solving software
possessed by the individual.

human

by

strategies. Strategic

(to

"the complexity of the

use a computer analogy)

Rules and procedures evolve to simplify the uncertainties

interaction.

Institutions

exist

cooperation by limiting the choice sets of the actors.

to

As

reduce complexity of

a result, a

way

out

verify the basic behavioral postulate of rational choice theory, namely, that

act in a rational-calculative

styles

gaps, are pictured as designing institutions as a

and utility-maximizing strategy

involved in

As North

inconclusive.

manner and

is

human

managed

human

to

actors

that institutions are the product of strategic

interaction. Social agents are understood to act strategically because they reahze the need

to devise institutional constraints in order to avoid the costhness of information deriving

from

latent existing

CD gaps.

**
For "some interesting attempts," North (1990)
Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985.

”

North, 1990, p.25.
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refers to the

works of Cavalli-Sforza and

Formal and informal

constraints.

Institutions,

due

to

the

culture-integrative

approach, are differentiated into patterns of constraints
that are "informal" and "formal"
character. Before getting into details, caution

"informal"

since,

constructs,

that, as such,

testify, the

and

advised regarding the domain of the

deriving from North's text, the "informal" renders a
network of

conceptual linkages
following will

is

in

escape

"informal"

behavior."

It

is

strictly linear-causal

modes of

thought.

As

the

approached via the concepts of "culture," "mental

is

emphasized

that

North does not provide a simple

formula for ways to convey these concepts into a transparent order.

North defines "informal rules"
modifications of formal rules,

(2)

in terms of (1) extensions,

socially

elaborations, and

sanctioned norms of behavior, and (3)

internally enforced codes of conduct.^^ (Formal constraints,

on the other hand, provide

order by means of formal-legal structures.) Each aspect of informal rules

is

elaborated

with the aid of empirical examples.

1.

According

to

the

first

definition,

elaborations, and modifications of formal rules."

the

informal

denote

rules

To provide an example. North invokes

case of congressional committee power that evolved from

specified task to

deal

"extensions,

its

constitutionally

with specific problems of exchange. Committee chairs and

members became endowed with

a degree of bargaining

power over

legislation that cannot

be derived from the formal-legal structure alone but denotes an integral underpinning of
unwritten and customized rules. These unwritten rules, however, did evolve as a

complementary structure

For

in support of the constitutionally specified task.

details, see North, 1990, p. 40.
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To

2.

illustrate socially

sanctioned norms of behavior, North provides
the example

of Alexander Hamilton's decision to engage
night before he

and wrote out
course,

was

was

engage

the reasons

all

that

to

in a duel.

in the duel with

why he

he was likely to get

As North

vividly describes: "The

Aaron Burr, Alexander Hamilton

killed. Yet, in spite

of the overwhelming rational

The

3.

modeled
in

first

game

constraints, that North describes, can be

of wealth-maximizing strategies and lend themselves to treatment

theory frameworks. Accordingly, rational-calculative styles of theorizing are

singled out as providing a viable basis for inquiring into the

rules,

since

maximizing
situations

her

to

Social norms dictated the choice, not formal ones."”

two types of informal

in the context

would be

by such a decision because dueling was the accepted way

among gentlemen.

settle disputes

down

should not accept this challenge; a crucial one, of

basis for not dueling, he felt that his effectiveness in the public
arena
significantly diminished

sat

rule

compliance and

strategies. Internally

"when

is

design

are

two cases of informal

deducible

from wealth-

enforced codes of conduct, on the other hand, describe

the individual gives up wealth or

utility function."^® In this

behavior, which

institutional

first

income

for

some other value

in his or

context North points to the example of legislator's voting

not sufficiently explained by interest group models. The analysis of

voting behavior by legislators

is

deemed

to

recommend

the inclusion of subjective

preferences and value-systems into the research agenda. Within the class of informal

rules,

internally enforced codes of conduct, motivations that represent a distinctive

Ibid.

Ibid.
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category, approximates the universal foundation of
cultural values by transcending the

narrow margins of economic

self-interest

and strategic

interaction.^’

Approaching informal rules within the context of

strategic interaction raises the

question of what might render the distinctive quality of the class of informal
constraints.

Formal and empirical informal

rules,

concerning the class of behavioral norms and so-

called "extensions" of formal rules, follow the

norms, as integral elements of a

same path of

origination.^^ Behavioral

society's cultural heritage, are seen as

emerging from

micro-level interactions.^^ Rational decisions of strategic actors transform over time into
habituated forms and stabilized attitudinal matrices. Both types of rules, as previously

mentioned, are deducible from wealth-maximizing strategies
mirror the action-specific context of power and

interest.

Some

that,

like formal rules,

confusion results form the

behavioral approach to informal rules since the theorem of strategic interaction was

formerly reserved for "hard" types of theorizing that denounced the significance of

cultural variables.

As North

formal constraints

is

traditions at

one end

indicates himself: "The difference between informal and

one of degree. Envision a continuum from taboos, customs, and
to written constitutions at the other.

Both types of constraint

North (1990, p.40) refers at this instance to the article of Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan.
1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics." American Economic Review, Vol.74, pp.
279-300.
This argument spares the category of internally enforced codes of conduct, as more
empiricist
transcendental values in general, whose path of origination is insufficiently clarified from an
conducive
more
are
they
since
norms
behavioral
of
category
the
focuses in his inquiry on
standpoint. North

to empirical observation

and therefore rational-calculative modulation, whereas non-wealth-maximizing

values are difficult to anzdyze.

North, 1990, p.87; Weber, 1954, p.68.

^

North, 1990, p.46.
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denve

(to a certain extent)

from utility-maximizing

empirical level) the function to reduce complexity in

Informal rules,

it

is

"Where do informal

himself gives the answer: "They

part of the heritage

we

human

and serve equally

(at the

interaction.

suggested, differ from formal ones with respect
to their

origination and transmission.

He

strategies

come from

call culture.

The

constraints

come from?"

asks North.^^

socially transmitted information and are

central qualification of informal rules

is that

they are part of a society's cultural heritage and that they have been socially
transmitted.

What, however,
transmitted

is

North referring to when he mentions that informal rules are

information?

The term "informal" within

this

equation

socially

signifies

the

transmission mechanism by means of which norms are learned and disseminated. This
qualification

emerges more clearly from Weber's

text

where "conventional"

(in the sense

of socially sanctioned norms of behavior) become specified with respect to the
"sociological structure of coercion."^^

While

the

to ensure the systematic transmission of legal

structure,

social

transmission

characterizes

modem

state apparatus has the capacity

norms by force of
the

absence

of

its

bureaucratic support

this

very transmission

mechanism. Freedom from bureaucratic coercion, however, does not
control.

As Weber emphasizes, informal

obliterate social

rule derogation is sanctioned

by the

context, even though a permanently staffed organization to implement coercion

As

a result,

it is

mainly with respect to the means of coercion

North, 1990, p.37.

Weber, 1954, pp.20-33.
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that the

is

social

absent.

normative realms of

society and state-bureaucracy differ. Instead
of guaranteeing rule transmission by
the
threat of coercive force, social transmission
of rules follows the imperative of cultural

inheritance.

Institutional Effects

lowering transaction

costs.

The

effect of institutions

on human behavior describes

the concept of transaction costs.^* Institutions (formal and informal)
lower transaction

costs because they provide a

mechanism

for enforcing contractual agreements.

eclectic structure of the approach, institutional effects are sorted out

Due

to the

between formal and

informal constraints.

Informal constraints. Informal constraints are modeled to lower transaction costs

when

self-interested agents perceive subjectively felt incentives to live

up

to the terms of

contract. Integral to this approach is the notion of contractual self-enforcement. Informal

rules are pictured as substituting for a system of bureaucratic coercion

the

exchange share the behef or perception

constraints

on

enforcement

that

it is

when

in their interest to

the parties to

impose informal

their conduct, regardless of the absence of a sophisticated (third-party)

structure.

Thus,

contracts

are

self-enforcing

when human

actors

are

convinced that informal rules render a viable framework for contract performance.
Consequently, the question

arises,

under what conditions are

strategic actors

hkely to

Transaction costs are understood to represent the composite of information and enforcement
costs. Information costs result from the measurement of valuable attributes of exchanged goods, while
enforcement costs arise from the implementation of reached agreements. While the above already discussed
the utility of institutions based

on the occurrence of information-related contingencies,

discussion emphasizes the costs of enforcing transactions.
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the ensuing

accept the viabiUty of informal rules for structuring
incentives in social, economic, and
political exchanges.^^

Informal rules are likely to structure incentives

in

human exchanges when

the

context of action rewards such agency. North focuses on
the number of the parties to the

exchange and the evolution of a dense network of

social interaction.

He

postulates that

incentives for cooperative behavior most likely derive from the
circumstance in which the
parties to the

exchange have a great deal of knowledge about each other and

in multiple transactions.

The development of

example of economic history

the

Law Merchant

are involved

renders a paradigmatic

for such a system of self-enforcing norms.^° This process

started out in

medieval Western Europe when merchants from the Mediterranean, the

Germanic and

Baltic region were meeting at the great international fairs along the

routes through Europe.

Through evolving business

practice, the mercantile

main

community

then devised a cosmopolitan body of rules governing transactions outside the official
jurisdiction of the kings. Leading in this

development were

Italian

merchants who spread

the technology and pertinent rules of credit, including the techniques of negotiable

To be

sure, "contracts"

and "informal rules" are not the same. The term contract (North, 1990,

p.53) stands here for the different (empirical) ways exchanges get organized, "whether through firms,
franchising, or other more complex forms of agreement that extend in a continuum from straightforward

market exchange

to vertically integrated." Informal rules,

on the other hand, stand

normative constraints ranging from empirical phenomena as "habits"

for a heterogeneous set of

to internally enforced codes of

conduct that involve transcendental qualities (see definitions above). In this way, it is possible for informal
rules to deliver an endogenous support structure for contract performance without necessarily specifying the
concrete form of conduct. However, the issue remains somewhat ambiguous since North employs both

terms simultaneously without drawing a clear distinction.

^ The "Law Merchant,"

according to

W.

Mitchell (1969) characterizes "a body of rules and

principles relating to merchants and mercantile transactions, distinct from the ordinary law of the land.
Possessed of a certain uniformity in its essential features, it yet differed on minor points from place to
place." Additional features are

creating his "laws out of his

evolutionary character, based on evolving patterns of business practice
social
needs and views," its emphasis on "speedy justice and equity in

its

own

relations, as well as its international scope (Mitchell 1969, pp.lOff.).

pp.332-356) and James M. Murray (1999).
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See also Harold

J.

Berman (1983,

instruments,

bills

of exchange and promissory notes throughout
Western Europe.

Enforceability appeared to have

conduct

in fraternal orders

threatened with ostracism.

its

beginnings

in the

of guild merchants; those

The conception

that

development of

who

internal codes of

did not live up to them were

dense social networking provided for

contractual self-enforcement in the case of medieval merchant practice

is

re-stated within

other discourses of economic history. Lowry, for instance, argues that formerly,

it

was

the

"protective shell" of a close-knit fraternity of international merchants that mobilized the

necessary quantum of trust and cooperation in order to secure the development of

advanced forms of credit.^*

By invoking conceptions of
image of

"internal codes," "fraternal orders," and lastly the

"protective shell," the previously described action context involves both

behavioral and transcendental elements.

As

a consequence,

one may question

to

what

extent the behavioral structure of exchange might actually be shaped in the image of

overiirching belief-systems, or vice versa.

that the

group of economic actors

may

The

hypothetical case has to be accounted for

actually constitute a

"community of believers"

emulate (by intentional design or accidentally) certain transcendental principles

that

in the

organization of exchange. Besides North, other accounts of economic history are more

explicit

on

this point

by demonstrating

that certain belief-systems exerted a positive

influence on economic development and the flourishing of

the case

is

commerce

in particular. Thus,

presented that certain hard-to-measure beliefs might eventually be the central

criterion for

making informal

rules effective and contracts self-enforcing. Evidence for

Lowry, 1979, pp. 246ff.
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such type of reasoning accrues from Weber

who

demonstrates that merchants were

formerly associated in so-called "cult-communities"^^
that operated under the protection

of their special patron god. Merchants of early Republican
Rome, for instance, recognized

Mercury

as their patron god. Characteristic of such fraternally
organized societies

obligation to

come

mutual aid in emergencies and the observance of

to

Berman, on the other hand, emphasizes
mercantile

community made

of

guarantees.^^

legal

enforcement

community

cult meals.

that only the firm belief in the future of the

possible to circulate various forms of credit in the absence

Trade

which

all

individual self-interests

norms

the

in

negotiable

instruments

without

guaranteed

state

seen to reveal a strong belief in both the integrity and future of the

is

to

it

was

debtors and creditors belonged. Within this action context,

merge

into a transcendental super-structure that

makes informal

effective. Contracts are self-enforcing because certain beliefs play an important

role in the incentive structure of

human

actors.

Leaning towards "hard" types of theorizing. North subsumes
performance

under

umbrella

"incentive"

for

strategies.

Clearly, North abrogates any ambition that

contract

the

of

"interest"

and

wealth-maximizing

would undermine

the micro-

foundations

of rational choice theory. In contrast to the previously hypothesized

institutional

scheme. North argues that beliefs and internally enforced codes "function" as

strategic devices to

lower transaction costs. Behef-systems, instead of representing values

Weber, 1954,

p.

171; See also The Protestant Ethic

Translated by T. Parsons. London and

New York:

Routledge.

See, for example, Berman, 1983, pp.338-51.

North, 1990, p.56f.
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and

the Spirit of Capitalism. 1992.

in

own

their

right,

become

operational

because they are perceived as rendering

enforcement mechanisms in a wealth-maximizing action
context. The notion

embrace certain

actors

wealth

beliefs out of instrumental utility in order to

that

human

maximize individual

central to this perspective.^^ Internal codes and
beliefs are thus understood to

is

derive ultimately from material interests in the service of
personal material wealth-

maximization, as expressed in the following statements: "Frequently
the exchange

is set

within a context of elaborate rituals and religious precepts to constrain the
participants."^^

Under what conditions

will contracts tend to be self-enforcing? In a wealth-

maximizing world, the answer can be

when

it

stated very simply. Contracts will be self-enforcing

pays the parties to live up to them..."^’'

informal rules effective. North calls

"iteration."

The foundations of

To

special

this type

stipulate

attention

to

whether

"it

pays" to

behavioral

the

make

factor

of

of reasoning are rendered by game theoretic

research and in particular the seminal text of Robert Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of

Cooperation, which emphasizes the concept of iteration for inducing cooperative
strategies.

The prospect of iterated "games,"

on uncooperative

strategies.

argued, projects a "shadow of the future"

Gains from iterated cooperation exceed the

"running off with the profits."

It is

it is

As

a result,

it

profitability of

depends on the utility-maximizing calculus

noted, however, that this conception of the transcendental or what
contradicts North's assumption (see

3'^^

was formerly

referred to

definition of "informal rules") that internal

endowments
not be modeled by means of wealth-maximizing or game theoretic strategies. In addition, North
vacillate between two diverging conceptions of internally enforced codes of conduct. At one

as cultural

codes

may

seems

to

instance he emphasizes the "importance of self-imposed codes of behavior in constraining maximizing
behavior in many contexts is also evident (1990, p.43)." On the other hand, he emphasizes that it would be
"prohibitive" to rely

on a "purely voluntary system of third-party enforcement"

the uncertainties of impersonal exchange characteristics (1990, p.58).

North, 1990, p.35.

North, 1990, p.55.
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in

an environment marred by

of the individual entrepreneur and his perception of the
Stipulate

whether contracts

Formal

will

when economic

be self-enforcing.

Formal constraints

constraints.

strategic action context in order to

are

modeled

to

lower transaction costs

actors are in the position to resort to bureaucratic
coercion to ensure

contract enforcement. North applies in this context the formula
of impersonal exchange
in order to discuss a type of

According

enforcing.

economic

to this

interaction

model,

it is

where contracts

are obviously not self-

very unlikely that the parties to the exchange

perceive incentives to live up to the terms of contract with respect to both the strategic

and

cultural contexts of action.

The

strategic action context of impersonal

exchange advises the introduction of

bureaucratic coercion into contractual relations in order to ensure contract enforcement.

Impersonal exchange describes an action context where iteration rates of exchange are
uncertain and where the parties to the exchange have only incomplete and asymmetric

access to information. This includes the attitudinal matrix of the exchanging parties and

the valuable attributes of exchanged goods, as well. Exchanges are complex and highly

contractual.

The

specialization to be

level of contracts,

met

in

on the other hand, correlates with the degree of

an economy. The greater the specialization and the number and

variability of valuable attributes, the

more

crucial

is

the availabihty of institutions that

North, 1990, pp.l2, 34, 55-58.

The significance of contract is echoed in S. Todd Lowry's account. He argues that contractual
agreements denote "the" device structuring future economic activities. Lowry contends that contracts are
"individualized systems of economic planning" that create future rights disassociated from the necessary
present existence of either the goods or

money

as the substance of exchange (S.

Todd Lowry, 1979, pp.243-

an instrument of economic planning which
60).
requisite for
permits individuals to organize the enforceable commitments (raw materials, labor, marketing)
would
undertakings. Without the legal sanction of private contract, economic planning

Lowry

further argues: "In this very real sense, contract

is

complex economic
be limited

to the patterns structured

by custom

...

or independently controlled resources
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(Ibid., p.253).

allow individuals to engage in complex contracting.
Thus, the higher the degree of

complexity in economic exchange measured in terms of
contractual

settings, the greater

the imperative to devise formal constraints becomes.

obviously does "not

pay

make

to

As

a result,

it

informal rules effective within the strategic action context
of impersonal

exchange. In the context of a wealth-maximizing world, where there
are high costs of

measurement and where

it

is

ambiguous whether economic

actors feel the subjective

incentive to live up to their contractual agreements, the gains from cheating
and reneging
are likely to exceed the gains

from cooperative behavior. Impersonal exchange,

then,

anticipates the availability of coercive enforcement, usually denoted in the person of the

state, in

order to ensure contract fulfillment.

As

third-party enforcement in business affairs, as

Weber's
analysis,

text,

a result, the concern for the probability of

Weber acknowledges,

providing a contrasting scheme to

strictly

opens a cultural perspective on the action context of

Underlying

is

the conception that legal development

perception. In the

modem

is

is "considerable."'^®

behavioral

modem

from

interpretation.

abstract

The focus

context of strategic action, formal mles, according to Weber's

principles

rests

via

formally

correct

and

when

they have been

logically

consistent

on formal-rational processes of reasoning. Relevant key

words denote the Weberian concepts of "formal

legal rationality" and "bureaucratic

domination." The vision field of socio-political actors

common

relations.

conditioned upon power and

ideal-typical study, represent legitimate stimuli for business practice

derived

exchange

modes of

set of basic understandings,

is

pictured to converge around a

which emphasize the

Weber, 1954, p.71.
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rational capacity of the

individual as epitomized by categories of
calculability and self-interest.'” The ultimate

m

belief

the "legality" of abstract rules and the
appropriateness of "rational" conduct in

human exchange
where

human

has entered a stage of cultural development

life

social actors (in an ideal-Weberian sense) recognize
the "sanctity" of legal-rational

rules of conduct.

the

anticipates that

Expanding contractual

breakdown of former

enforcement.

It is

traditions

relations represent the increase of

of

fraternal

standards

of

anonymity and

performance

and

understood that disintegration of former standards of performance,

evolving from the realm of commerce, prompted the need for an integrated system
of
legally enforceable norms.

Both authors, however, acknowledge

that the real

world situation of exchange

might deviate somewhat from the described categories. "Looking only

at the

formal rules

themselves, therefore, gives us an inadequate and frequently misleading notion about the
relationship between formal constraints and performance."'^^

elaborates: "I have stated, of course, an extreme

On

the contrary, as North

form of impersonal exchange, because

in

the real world, whether present or past (where impersonal exchange did occur to a

degree),

we

find

compliance."'^'*

that

make

all

kinds of mitigating circumstances by which parties attempt to assure

One of

informal

those mitigating "circumstances" render voluntary organizations

rules

effective

by lowering information costs

about

market

participants as, for instance, better business bureaus, credit, and insurance rating agencies.

See Weber, 1954, pp.65-86, 145f, 301-21.

Weber, 1954, pp.39f,

145f, 158-167.

North, 1990, p.53.

^ North,

1990, p.55.
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Institutions, hence, unfold ultimate efficacy
in lowering transaction costs

when both

formal and informal constraints merge into one coherent
institutional framework. This
special case of institutional interplay

IS

is

considered to matter in Western societies where

it

"taken for granted" that informal codes of conduct and state
enforced rules coincide in

the mind-set of individual agents.

As North

put

it,

"when economists

talk about efficient

markets, they have simply taken for granted an elaborate framework of
constraints.

The

institutional constraints that define the opportunity set of individuals are
a

of formal and informal constraints. They make up an interconnected web that

combinations shapes choice

How

sets in various contexts.

North does not provide a definite formula, but touches on

[...1

complex

in various

does such interplay evolve?

this

problem

in his analysis of

institutional change, discussed in the next section.

Institutional Origin

Intentional

momentum

and Change
design deriving from calculated self-interest denotes the central

directing institutional change, since

it

is

posited that institutions are the

product of strategic interaction. Institutions change because economic, social, and

political entrepreneurs

constraints

measured
the

maximizes individual

in

game

share the perception that the "re-negotiation" of institutional

utility functions."^^

The gains from cooperation

terms of alternative pay-off matrices. Entrepreneurs

either directly,

by devoting resources

North, 1990, pp.66f.

North, 1990, p.86.
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to

new

may change

profitable

are

the rules of

opportunities or

indirectly,

by estimating the costs and benefits of devoting resources

enforcement of
this

way on

scenarios,

rules.

The amount of resources devoted

the latitude of expected pay-offs.

then,

verifies

the

behavioral

demonstrating that institutional change
This

simple

model of

is

The

to institutional

analysis,

change,

The

analysis

demonstrating that

in

rational

choice

by

interaction.'*’^

however,

sophisticated version in North's text where he constructs a

causation.

of

outcome of strategic

institutional

change depends

by focusing on cost-benefit

micro-foundations

the

to alter the rules or

appears

in

a

more

more complex chain of

then integrates macro-level phenomena of political

life

by

input for change derives from evolutionary variables, like

initial

population dynamics and technological innovation. These variables become operational
via his concept of "relative prices."'*^

ratio

of factor prices

to land),

changes

(i.e.,

Changes

changes in the

in the cost

ratio

in relative prices include changes in the

of land to labor, labor to capital, or capital

of information, and changes

significantly, military technology). In the

individual, structural changes of the

mind of

it is

in the interest

technology (including

the rational and utility-maximizing

human environment

the shape of price variations. Price changes, then, affect

whether

in

are deciphered

and computed

in

human behavior by determining

of strategic agents to re-negotiate existing

rules. Evolution (as

a macro-level process) thus enters the equation of rational-calculative styles via the route

of relative prices.

An example

of changing "relative prices" presents the demise of

serfdom. North points out that the late-medieval plague minimized the number of

serfs

likewise, emphasized the significance of strategic and thus self-interested behavior
the
rules. "Individual invention" and purposive agreements circumscribe
economic
in the creation of new
pp.68-75).
norms
legal
(1954,
primary sources for new

Max Weber,

North, 1990, p.84.
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and thus changed the

ratio

of land and labor

in

such a

way

that the parties involved

perceived the usefulness of re-negotiating the contractual
framework. Because lords,
the aftermath of the plague,

became more dependent on

in

the subalterns they were forced to

yield in a sequence of "re-negotiations" of the terms
of "contract" governing the feudal
relationship.

The end

result of these re-negotiations, then, ultimately brought
about the

liberation of the serfs.

Change. Another source of

Idgological

cognitive endowments.

On

is

rendered by

the mental plane of rational decision-makers surface certain

ideas, meanings,

and visions, which lead

concerning

desirability

the

change

institutional

to the re-defmition of individual preferences

of certain

actions.

The transformation of

individual

preferences, however, might result in discrimination against previous practice at the

macro-level. North refers in this context to the abolition of slavery in the U.S. as an
indicator for the force of ideas.

entirely accounted for

"A major

by a change

institutional

in relative prices

and

change
in

that

by

itself

cannot be

which ideas mattered was

the

consequence of the growing abhorrence on the part of civilized human beings of one
person owing another and therefore the

rise

of the antislavery

movement throughout

the

world."'^^

The attempt

to describe

and explain the impact of ideas on human behavior via

cost-benefit- models, however, leaves a bitter aftertaste because

it

does not keep

its

promise to provide a convincing formula for the significance of ideological concepts.

Why

should

IQ^*'

century U.S. cotton farmer feel compelled to envision the critique of

North, 1990, p.85.
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their liberal-minded fellow citizens as

something exacting a high price? North does not

account for the case that slave owners did not share the same feelings and beliefs as

members of

the antislavery

movement.

On

the contrary, North implicitly presumes the

condition of cultural homogeneity, so that both parties, regardless of their self-interests,
share

same

the

concerning

vision

slavery.

This

presumption,

however,

is

counterproductive to North's general rational-calculative focus. Ideological heterogeneity
instead of cultural homogeneity actually corresponds with strictly wealth-maximizing

Ignorance of antislavery sentiments on the part of cotton farmers actually

strategies.

signifies the rational strategy to avoid the high (moral) costs for

basis of a game-theoretic context of action, cotton farmers

employing

slaves.

would have been

deliberately ignore the argument of the enlightened critics in order to

On

the

better off to

maximize

"utility."

Thus, the provision of a simple mechanism for linking ideological phenomena
with situations of market exchange seems precarious. As North concedes: "...we are

at

still

something of a loss to define, in very precise terms, the interplay between changes

relative prices, the ideas

the

two play

visions

in inducing

and ideologies
changes in

emerge within the

that

form people's perceptions, and the roles

institutions."^*^ It is

social context.

The usual way out

from game-theoretic models, which, however,
strategies.

Consequently,

it

is

unclear

acknowledged

is

how

ideas, meanings,

to derive behavioral

in

that

and

norms

are biased towards wealth-maximizing

that ideas

and visions exert a formative

to provide "neat
impact on institutional development without, however, being able

models" of cultural development and

interplay.^'

North, 1990, p.86.
North, 1990, pp.42, 44f.
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B argaining.

In addition to factors of self-interest
and culture, the concept of

bargaining power delivers a crucial analytical tool
towards the study of institutional

change. "Moreover,

it is

counts. Hence, only

when

to

alter

the

of

it is

in the interest

of those with sufficient bargaining strength

formal rules will there be major changes

framework.
styles

the bargaining strength of the individuals and
organizations that

in

the

formal institutional

This perspective on institutional change corresponds with
more recent
rational-calculative

negotiating parties.”

Power

is

analysis

that

measured

in terms of "threat points,"

emphasize

the

power

differentials

of

which denote the

option to threaten the other parties to withdraw from the negotiations and to leave
the
status

quo unchanged, while the

According

to

game

costs of non-cooperation

theoretical analysis the party with

to claim a "Rambo-position."

continuance of the status quo

is

To

the party

who

would be

more

inflicted

on the

threat points can be

latter.

modeled

finds itself in a Rambo-position, the

a viable option, while the other parties face a

dilemma of

providing the "Rambo" with sufficient incentives for invoking cooperative behavior.

Under these circumstances,
institutional

attainment

the

of

change depends on the consent of

identifies uncooperative strategies as a viable

Historically,

in a so-called

it

Rambo

was

cooperation

seems

player,

whose

that

position vis-a-vis economic agents.

made use of

its

the disadvantage of individual entrepreneurship.

North, 1990, p.68.
See, for example, Knight 1992

&

utility

since

function

"game" option.

the state, and the political elite in particular,

instances where the political elite

unlikely

1994.
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Economic

which found
history

itself

is full

of

power

to

Weber

demonstrates, for instance, that

advance their

self-interests to

the development of the legal concept of the

England because of the domestic power

modem

business corporaUon was delayed in

structure.

Generally

it appears, however, that the
development of the legal structure of organizations has
by
no means been predominantly determined by economic
factors. This fact is provided primarily by
the sharp contrast between medieval and also modem
English developments, on the one hand, and
the continental, especially the German, development,
on the other. In English law [...] no concept
of corporation of the continental type was developed until
modem times. Apart from mdimentary
beginnings, there was no group autonomy in the sense and
scope in which it was taken for granted
in medieval Germany [...] The real reasons for
the developments both in England on the one side
and on the Continent, specifically Germany, on the other, were

primarily political ones. This
statement applies to the Middle Ages as well as to the early
modem period. The essential
difference was this: In England royal power was strong and centralized
and, under the Plantagenets
and their successors, disposed highly developed technical means of administration.
In Germany, on
the other hand, no political center was in existence.*'*

In England, the establishment of a corporation then

concept of limited purpose while being
bureaucracy. The formation of

modem

depended on special grant and the

under constant supervision of the

state

commercial law, however, was conditioned upon

the transformation of hierarchical and politicized

power

stmctures, which traditionally

subjugated the demands of economic entrepreneurs.

The Law Merchant,

as the "continental" type of doing business,

owes

its

official

recognition to the circumstance that the political elite abandoned particularistic modes of

governance (autocratic, patrimonial
politically established class

etc.).

To

attract foreign

was frequently ready

to

abandon the

broaden the legal basis of international commercial law. In

interest"

since the

evolved serving the perceived

emergence of

self-interest at

merchants to the

status

this sense, a

fairs, the

quo and

"community of

both ends of the political spectrum

capital markets also benefited the state's financial needs.

*'*

Weber, 1954, pp.169-188.

**

Murray, 1999, p.78.
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to

As

the

expanding mercantile community contributed
regions, merchants

to

the

were subsequently granted special

law independently. Foreign merchants were allowed
judges from

among

own

Privileges

laws.

international

fairs

their

own

of

economic growth of urbanized
rights to administer

to

commercial

choose mercantile councils and

fellow citizens and to governing themselves under their

"participatory

adjudication"

were

first

and markets, which were thereupon extended

granted

into

at

great

permanently

instituted organs of administration at the city-state level.^^ "Consuls of
merchants"

elected to

sit

on commercial cases

mercantile cases within the

city.

that gradually

The northern

were

extended their jurisdiction over

city-states,

all

assuming the vanguard role

within these developments, at that time, integrated these mechanisms into the permanent
legal

framework of

European

cities

their

town

charters and spread this recipe throughout Europe. Other

adopted the Italian institution of the merchant counsel or else developed

similar institutions

for

adjudication of commercial cases by merchant judges.

The

Freiburg charter of 1120, for instance, stipulated that cases of commercial disputeresolution should not be decided

customary and legitimate law of
of Cologne.

As

on

all

the basis of rules of political authority "but by the

merchants and especially by the law of the merchants

a result, the development of mercantile law

was

largely left to the

merchants themselves, so that the process of institutionalizing the rules of the game began
in a

bottom-up fashion. The standards for fulfillment and enforcement of contracts

emerged out of custom and practice which, over

stemmed from

time, took on regularity. Compliance

the legitimacy of the rules and the fact that businessmen had actively

Berman, 1983, pp.346ff.

” Mitchell,

1969, p.28.
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participated in their development.^* Conditional for this development, however,

decentralization

of

political

power

that

provided

opportunity to formalize their exchange practices.

Berman, 1983, p.340.
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the

mercantile

community

was
the

CHAPTER

3

IMPERIAL STATE CAPACITY
Under the imperial regime,

state

capacity materialized in the prerogative of

Russian officialdom to exercise, among other things, an effective
veto right over
corporate development in the Russian lands and to resist business demands
to enact a

competitive type of corporate governance modeled on European standards of business
conduct.

To

better understand this episode of bureaucratic

empowerment,

section inquires into the institutional bases of the imperial regime.

question

is

As

the following

a consequence, the

asked what institutional reasons might have existed to empower Russian

officialdom against the interest structure of society? In addition, the question

means of what

institutional

societal pressures for

change?

it

would seem

raised

arrangement was the imperial bureaucracy able

It is

therefore the

aim of

this chapter to

the institutional bases underlying imperial Russian state capacity.

thought,

is

that the imperial

shed some

As

by

to resist

light

on

a preliminary

regime was relying on state-centered hierarchical

structuring of interest organization and stratification in order to fashion policy. This

should emerge more clearly from the case study of corporate law reform in 1858-1874.
Prior to discussing such structural concerns, however,

affairs

of Russian business

life in

it

appears logical to inquire into the

order to give a hvely picture of the historical frame of

reference.
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Corporate Entrepreneurship

Under

mix of formal

in Imperial

Russia

the imperial regime, corporate entrepreneurship
had to deal with a curious
legality

and informal procedures

that, as such,

were counterproductive

to

the needs of corporate Russia.

To

that entrepreneurial initiative

was discouraged by means of bureaucratic regimentation

that, in the final analysis,

observers of the Russian

would hinder

field,

it

is

a familiar narrative

the evolution of a decent code of conduct.

The

condition of bureaucratic tutelage was in this respect especially to the detriment
of
smaller and medium-sized businesses that could not afford to go

all

the

way through

the

bureaucratic process. In his assessment of the Russian business climate. Professor Ivan

Ozerov noticed

in 1916:

The old regime, with all its restrictions and prohibitions, hindered and discouraged all initiative by
making success depend on the authorization of the governing officials. It annihilated all energies,
smothered all humane feelings with the masses, and although industrial energies abounded in
Russia they remained unexploited and of no benefit

to

anyone, like our forests and mineral wealth.

[...The czarist regime] does not allow a free field of activity to individuals;

it imposes restrictions
and hindrances. Without an ukaz a Russian does not dare do anything. This ukaz is so discouraging

that

it

incapacitates him. ...[Bureaucrats]

employ

creating hindrances, obstacles, and restrictions.

Of

particular significance

was

all their

energies,

edl

their intellectual efforts in
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the design of entry rules since they

were instrumental

for

the imposition of bureaucratic tutelage over business affairs. According to the letter of the

law, the so-called concession system mandated that every corporate charter had to

undergo a screening process

that

would involve

Ministers, and ultimately Czar himself

the relevant Ministries, the

who would

Committee of

put his signature under the corporate

Ozerov, Ivan. Problemes economiques et financiers de la Russie modeme, Lausanne 1916,
1800-1917: A Study in tsarist
pp.45f. Quoted in T.C. Owen. 1991. The Corporation under Russian Law,
economic policy, Cambridge: University Press.
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chaner. In addition,

it

was required

that every

change

in the corporate charter

had to be

confirmed by the appropriate ministry. The general
assembly of stockholders,
instance,

authority.

was not allowed
It

was

to

stipulated that

change the terms of economic conduct on

no appeal procedure was

their

for

own

available to corporate founders

in case of denied concessions. In addition, the formal-legal
basis providing for increased

bureaucratic tutelage over corporate entrepreneurship was enlarged
within the course of
the conservative reaction (1881 to 1905). Additional restrictions
for corporate business

became

effective

worrisome

when

influential

foreigners

that

conservative

groups

considered

it

particularly

and Jewish minorities could take control of economic

enterprises in strategically sensitive areas. Obviously operating from a position of power,

the conservative stratum of Russian officialdom succeeded in bringing about legislation

that

would increasingly bar foreign

investors,

and

in especially

Jewish minorities, from

owning means of production.^®
However,
since

it

in contravention of the official policy a second set of rules

was recognized

that

emerged

foreign participation was urgently needed to sponsor

corporate development in the Russian lands. Parallel to the growing body of restrictive

laws

governing joint-stock corporations,

procedure that would

make

it

with

a

decree

regime established an administrative

possible for foreigners and Jewish minorities to acquire real

estate in so-called sensitive areas.

arose

the

dating

A

legal basis for this kind of rule-derogatory behavior

from November

1893.

Its

substance

stipulated

that

"exceptions" could be granted on a case-by-case basis. For this purpose, the corporate

on
Por a more detailed account see T.C. Owen, 1991', and in particular pp.l 18-132 {Restrictions
counteroffensive).
reactionary
{the
foreigners, Jews, and Poles) and pp.171-180
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would have

charter

to receive the signature of the

Committee of Ministers and

the Czar

himself.

A

political

and informal

consequence of these processes was

legal practice

The described

began

to

that a gulf

between

official policy

emerge under the stewardship of the Czarist regime.

legal discrepancies then coincided with a situation

where most enterprises

operated in contradiction to the general laws. As Professor Ivan T. Tarasov
observed

1878

in

:

The development of

corporations in Russia in recent years has taken place, as it were, outside the
even despite it, because it is difficult to find among the charters of joint-

legislation in force, or

stock companies accepted and confirmed in the past decade a single charter that does not consist
entirely of a systematic collection of exceptions [to the law].*'

In

both incorporation procedures, the official concession system and

addition,

unofficial counterpart, underlined the discretionary

powers of the imperial bureaucracy

its

to

influence corporate development at will. In this way, Russian entrepreneurs were exposed

to relatively high levels of uncertainty since the imperial bureaucracy,

which

between benevolent neglect and decisive repression, controlled the entry
business

life.

how

barriers into

In the absence of a consistent system of formal-legal norms, the stakes for

Russian entrepreneurship were high. From the business point of view,
foresee

vacillated

the autocratic

modus operandi would

it

was

difficult to

play out in the next moment. Corporate

founders responded to the situation by lobbying for special favors from the imperial

bureaucracy.

*'

in T.C. Owen,
Ivan T. Tarasov. Uchenie ob aktsionemykh kompaniiakh. Kiev 1878; quoted

1991, p.77.
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A

good example describing

the administrative contingencies of the
concession

system emerges from the memoirs of Baron Nikolai E. Wrangel,
dated 1899.^^

An

official

turned businessman, Wrangel took the lead in negotiating the
incorporation of an electric

power company

to be erected in the

Caucasus region. Due

planned to give the enterprise the form of a limited

to the size of the project,

liability joint

stock venture.

it

was

The value

of the enterprise was an estimated 7 million rubles of stock to be distributed to leading

petroleum producers and managers of

electricity

companies.

Initial

safeguarded through a loan of the International Bank, headquartered
stipulated

by the 1836 code, the project

initiating

party,

financing

was

in St. Petersburg.

Wrangel and

his

As

fellow

entrepreneurs, had to draw up a corporate charter to be presented to the appropriate

administrative organs for approval.

Even though

the charter received initially a positive

response from the Minister of Finance, Count Witte, the project seemed

to

come

to

nothing since the charter also required the signature of the governor-general of the

Caucasus region. Prince Grigorii

S. Golitsyn.^^

"crazy petty tyrant [malyi samodur], with

his permission.

Wrangel then resorted

autocrat by approaching

him

whom

it

the dismay of the entrepreneurs, this

was

to the strategy to

difficult to deal," delayed giving

win the sympathy of the Caucasus

as a benevolent patron rather than as a rational decision-

As reproduced by T.C. Owen, 1991,

To

To

pp.l30f.

explicate the legal specifics of the situation,

restrictions applied for incorporation in the

it

Caucasus region.

should be mentioned that certain additional

A decree dating from November

1

893

only if their charters restricted
stipulated that corporations could purchase real estate in the Caucasus region
of Turkestan, or to natives of
natives
non-Christian
to
subjects,
Russian
Christian
the ownership of stock to
each case the corporation was
the Central Asian states immediately bordering the area. Moreover, in
to the minister of
governor-general,
the
via
land,
purchase
to
permission
for
petition
required to submit a
minister of finance. Three
the
of
approval
upon
grant
it
or
to
request
the
reject
war, who had the power to
mark on evolving corporate
powerful officials thus were endowed with a significant potential to put their
initiatives

according to their personal whims.
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maker. Accordingly, Wrangel awaited the winter social
season when the members of the

Russian aristocracy used to gather

in St. Petersburg.

On

this occasion, the Prince

seemed

inclined to give his blessings to the project because he recognized
the relative advantage

of electrical power lines that posed less of a
fields.

fire

hazard than steam engines

in the oil

Golitsyn also seemed pleased that the shares had already been
subscribed.

However,

mood changed

his

stockholders.

abruptly

Wrangel recounts

when he

learned the identity of the potential

that the Prince could reluctantly accept the idea of shares

being distributed to other corporate enterprises, such as the Siemens and Halske, of which

Wrangel was

However, Golitsyn

vice-president.

the role of the International

Bank and

lost his

the fact that

temper when Wrangel mentioned

it

was unknown who

else

would

that they could fall into the

hands of

acquire the remaining shares:

Golitsyn:

"What do you mean, unknown? Does

that

Jews

that. 1 will

£uid foreigners?

1

won't agree to

mean

not permit shares to the bearer.

How

the foreigners are fleecing Russia!"

Wrangel:
Golitsyn:

Wrangel:

"The minister of finance has already allowed them."
"Witte is a Mason and has been bought by foreigners."
"Perhaps, Prince, you have not read his speech in Moscow. He declared that Russia
cannot do without foreign capital. He of course would not have said this if the Czar
refused to allow foreign capital [into the country]."

Golitsyn:

"What do you mean,

the Czar!

He

doesn't

know what he wants and dances

to Witte's

tune. He's a milksop [Triapka]V'

Wrangel:

"Of course
than

Golitsyn:

I

[...]

you, Prince, as an adjutant general

know

the Czar's character better

do."

[angrily] "I won't allow

In the end, Golitsyn's resistance

was

it; I

won't,

finally

I

absolutely will not allow it!"^

overcome when the Czar himself signed the

corporate charter, which listed two Russians, Nikolai E. Wrangel and Viktor F. Golubev,

as founding parties.

From

^ Baron Nikolai E.

the short anecdote

some

useful data emerges concerning the

Owen, 1991,
1924. Vrangel, Vospominaniia. Berlin, pp. 158f; quoted in T.C.

pp.l30f.
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uncertainty level that Russian entrepreneurship was
exposed

to.

Certainly, the

more

obvious theme in the narrative of Baron Wrangel denotes the
spread of xenophobic

among

sentiments

the Russian gentry. In this particular case, the incorporation
of an

enterprise with a potential for high rates of return almost failed because
of the governorgeneral's attitudinal preoccupation. Instead of contemplating analytical
aspects of the

business

scheme, and acknowledging the economic benefits of the project under

consideration

as

essentially

upon

foreigners.

In

indicated

by Wrangel's devoted

talk,

Golitsyn's

decision

hinged

his subjectively felt fear of "selhng out" to non-orthodox minorities and

addition to cultural interpretations, the narrative also underlines the

institutional deficiencies of the existing

system of incorporation. To be

sure,

it

strikes the

observer to realize the scope of action that Golitsyn was provided by force of the

governing

system.

Accordingly,

discretionary powers to impose

the

Caucasus

autocrat

on business what seemed

personal sentiments. While Gohtsyn's

initial

was

endowed

with

the

to eclipse with the reality of his

response bore the connotations of active

involvement in favor of his subjects, the second and decisive impulse advises otherwise.

Driven by xenophobic

fears,

Gohtsyn neither cared

for the bodily security of his subjects

nor the eventual economic benefits associated with the project. In the end,

it

was

the

personal will of the autocratic decision-maker that counted, whose decisions seem to

evolve along contingent streams of consciousness. In imperial Russia, economic agents
thus faced the bizarre situation that, in addition to pervasive problems of bureaucratic

self-interest, relevant decisions

inflating

a tendency towards

criterion in

were delayed or even ignored because the emotional,
unpredictabihty and spontaneity, subdued the rational

governmental decision-making.
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Institutional

The ensuing

Arrangement

inquiry argues that the evolution of an effective
corporate governance

regime was compromised because the Russian

political input structure restricted policy-

making competency

to

Asymmetries depict

in this respect certain influence configurations

an asymmetric-hierarchical format of participatory entitlements.

Scales of influence are

Participation,

specified on the basis

on the other hand,

action that bears the imprint of

is

over policy choice.

of institutionally determined

rules.

understood to represent a special kind of political

its institutional

environment. Action fields of participation

emerge within the government system or along the

state-society interface. Within the

sphere of government activity, the study focuses on constitutionally specified organs of
legislative

authority and bureaucratic action channels in order to assess the inner-

governmental configuration of influence. Thereupon, the analysis inquires into the design
of

state- societal

to rule-making

exchanges in order to
authority.

Within

clarify to

this

what extent

overall

societal actors

do have access

analytical context, the picture of the

politically fashioned input structures should emerge.

Constitutional Constraints

The

analysis

of constitutional structures delivers an ambiguous message

determining state capacity. This situation

is

largely

due

to the delicate position that

constitutional concepts are placed within the Russian context. In cultural studies,

observed that the

realities

in

it

is

of a relatively arbitrary operating regime appear to prejudice
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notions of consUtutional constraint.® Under the
imperial regime, the executive branch

had the discretion to decide whether and to what extent
constrain

government operations.

government

itself

autocratic ruler

1

Emperor

principle,

was conditional upon

was above

the law, not

beyond himself. Emphasizing
Article

In

constitutional structures might

even the

institutional

of

autocratic will power. According to tradition, the

bound by

it,

nor responsible to anyone or anything

autocratic prerogative, cultural analysis frequently refers to

of the Complete Collection of law, which stipulates
is

structure

that:

"The All-Russian

an autocratic and unlimited monarch. Obedience to his supreme power not

only from fear but also from conscience

was endowed with

the autocratic ruler

is

ordained by

God

Himself."^^ In this manner,

a rightful claim for unlimited legal authority.

In practical terms, the autocrat had discretionary powers to change the format of

legislative procedure at

any time. Definition of policy instruments,

as well as the selection

of decision-making arena was conditional upon autocratic consent. As established by
Article 53 of the fundamental laws, executive authority could choose from a large range

of possible legislative procedures. Available alternatives according to which a law could

be

formulated

[uchrezhdeniia],

manifestos

codes

included

charters

[gramoty], ordinances

ukazes,

[manifesty],

Gosudarstvennogo

sovetd],

“ The classical texts

[ulozheniia],

are

and

opinions

statutes

[polozheniia],

of

[doklady]

reports

Berman (1963) who

[ustavy],

the

establishments

instructions

State

vouchsafed

[nakazy],

Council

[mneniia

the

emperor's

in

gives an extensive account of the judicial system;

focuses on the dominant position of executive authority in governmental interbranch relations; and Pipes (1974) who provides an interesting study of increasing violence injudicial

Brzezinski (1962)

who

affairs.

Berman, 1963,

p. 211.
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confirmation.^^ In addition, the autocratic ruler was

determine the playing
arena, the

field for

endowed with

policy-making. Standing

the discretion to freely

at the center

of the political

Czar had the freedom of choice from which of the various
government organs

to receive advice in legislative affairs.

Even though

the State Council took

on a

central

role in the coordination of legislative activity (see below).
Article 53 clearly implies that
it

was

far

from obligatory

to process legal projects through the State Council.

As

confirmed by an imperial order of November 1851, the possibility was acknowledged
circumvent State Council procedures by means of ministerial

to

reports. Ministers with the

Czar's approval issued administrative rulings with the force and scope of law. Procedural

requirement

for

such

action

was

the

that

issue

under

consideration

touched

simultaneously upon several ministries. Not surprisingly, as Whelan indicates, few
projects failed to

meet

this

criterion.^^

The Czar

could, at his pleasure, have laws

processed through organs other than the State Council. During the reign of Alexander

HI,

for instance, various ordinances concerned with state security, the press, and Jews were

confirmed and enacted

Another procedure

make

after

to avoid

having been pushed through the Committee of Ministers.

Council scrutiny,

it

was customary

for the autocratic ruler to

use of one or another agency of his personal bureaucracy to work out crucial pieces

of legislation. Thus, a good

many

divisions of His Imperial Majesty's

secret committees

legal issues

Own

were handled by the ever-proliferating

Chancery or by one of

his specially created

and commissions.

Whelan, Heide W. 1982. Alexander III
in Late Imperial Russia.

New

&

the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform

Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, here

Whelan himself refers

at p.49.

[footnote 19] at this instance to A. S. Alekseev, Russkoe gosudarstvenno

pravo, p.261.
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In the exercise of their consultative function,

government organs, however, could

never go beyond the outer limits set by any given
Czar. The scope of

autonomy of

legislative procedure therefore varied widely, not
only

The government organ of

within reigns.

interesting case since

its

was

between but also

the State Council provides in this respect an

significance for legal matters oscillated between high priority

and remote meaninglessness for the
the Council

institutional

affairs

of the central administration. Created in 181

to serve as the central consultative

body

for legislative matters.

primary function was the consideration of legislative projects before presentation

Supreme Power.

Official Council policy prescribed that the

Czar had

Council into policy-making. This procedural requirement was expressed

1,

Its

to the

to involve the

in Article

53 of

the fundamental laws (1832) according to which "intended implementation" of legal

projects

Council.

would include the provision
In

addition.

Article

50

having heard the opinion of the State

"after

stipulated the principle of overriding autocratic

decision-making power: "All legal projects are to be examined in the State Council and
submitted to the emperor's discretion; only by the action of the autocratic power can they

be given the intended implementation." However, neither in practice nor

wording of the formula

in

any way

restrict the autocrat's prerogative to

the advice or opinions given him.

requirements

came

Even

in theory did the

pay no attention

to

the observation of such minimal procedural

in conflict with imperial sense

of authority. Whelan delivers in

this

context an enlightening example of the basic situation. Expressing his aversion towards
regularized institutional procedures, Nicholas

Quoted

in

Whelan, 1982, p.48.
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I

uttered: "Really,

when

I

decide something

IS

useful and beneficial, do

I

first

have to ask without

fail

for the

agreement of the

Council?"'^®

For his choice of

anybody beyond himself

affairs, the autocratic ruler

On

was, in

the contrary, legal accountability

Czar. Legislative bodies, whose

effect,

not accountable to

was the prerogative of

the

members were hand-picked by

the Sovereign Power,

performed only advisory functions. The Council had no power

either to initiate or to

promulgate legislative projects;
free to accept, reject, or

its

modify

function was purely advisory, and the Czar remained

at will the Council's

scope of institutional autonomy in Council
articles

activities

recommendations. The delimited

emerges clearly from the

first three

of the Establishment:

1

In the hierarchy of state institutions, the Council

.

is

the

body

[soslovie] in

which

administration are ordered in their principal relations to legislation, and through
to the Supreme Imperial Power.
2.

Therefore, the preliminary drafts of

3.

No

all

parts of the

it

they rise up

all laws, statutes, and instimtions are submitted to and
considered by the State Council and then, by act of the Sovereign Power, forwarded for
implementation.

law, statute, or institution

may

issue

from the Council and be implemented without

confirmation by the Sovereign Power.’'

As

a result, a whole series of conflicting and contradictory norms and procedures

governed the legislative process.

Political

issues

tended to be decided by shifting

procedures and by the interplay of various bodies and certain favorites or persons
revolving around a formally supreme sovereign. The proliferation of legislative organs
ultimately evolved into a diffuse network of competency.

A clear demarcation of spheres

of influence, as characteristic for constitutionally delimited government, was absent.

’“Whelan, 1982, p.53.
’'

in

PSZRI [Polnoe sobranie zakonov

rossiiskoi imperii],

Whelan, 1982, p.41.
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sen, 31 (1810-1811), No.24064, quoted

Under conditions of procedural

uncertainty,

it

was

difficult to perceive

involved parties had a rightful claim to policy-making
competency.
legislative authority

depended upon the temporary

To be

will of the autocrat,

within executive discretion to select the format of
participation

in

which of the

sure, as long as

it

was always

policy-making on an

ad-hoc basis. Once again, the old regime undermines
institutional development by
interfering with the

most

ground rules of the

clearly within the

autocratic

domain of

modus operandi

participation, as they

legislative activity.

nullifies notions of

emerge from

game. This tendency manifested

political

Within

itself

legislative procedure, the

genuine participation. Components of

legislative procedure,

were usually removed from

the

public, lacking transparency, and certainly allocative efficiency. Accessible only
to a

small

number of

favorites

and bureaucratic

staff,

the structure of social input chances

hinged upon the personal discretion of the autocratic

ruler.

Action Channels
Administrative practice

autocratic omnipotence. Far

differed

substantially

from being involved

from the proclaimed

ideal

of

in all kinds of political transactions, the

capacity of the autocrat to cope with the flood of legal projects awaiting his decision

turned out to be rather limited.

legal issues

To be

sure,

under the old regime thousands of singular

were propelled to the highest echelons of government swamping the

the autocrat.

The Czar, however,

schedule, could not possibly

office of

exercising his discretionary powers on a rather tight

manage

all

of the political affairs awaiting imperial action.^^

The empire had become too complicated

For a detailed description of Nicholas

II

for one

man

to run,

even with the help of any

working day schedule, see Vemer, 1990.
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number of

favorite assistants; too

many

questions

demanded expert opinion, too many

matters required not just consent or denial, but informed
consent.

To remedy

the situation, Alexander

I

created the State Council.

Its

purpose was to

service the informational needs of imperial decision-making.
However, as previously
indicated, the Council

was not

to trespass the limits set

by autocratic

the Council should operate only as a regular consultative

was

Czar

to assist the

in legislative affairs

body

discretion.

As

a rule,

to the Czar. Its official role

by submitting informed recommendations

for

imperial action. In this consultative function, the Council had de Jure discretion
to work
as

the

central

government.
deficiencies,

coordination

mechanism Unking

the

However, even the State Council

which

it

was supposed

Czar with the other

itself

gave

rise

to

parts

organizational

to cure. Circumstantial evidence for such difficulties

emerges from a note of a Council member written

in 1884. Expressing his dissatisfaction

with the organizational inefficiency of the system, B.P. Mansurov complained:

member of

the State Council does his business as he should,

either to search out alUes or foresee

of

on

his

own

it is

"if a

impossible for him

everything that he should

-

nor, for that

matter, can he even read everything through properly.

The void
filled

separating official intent from de facto reaUty, then, was increasingly

by bureaucratic support

structures.

As supreme government

bodies had to wrestle

with overload, auxiUary organs emerged to take increasingly control of "business." Of

central

significance

in

this

respect

was

the

State

Chancery

{Gosudarstvennaia

kantseliariia) that transacted all kinds of Council business. All informational materials

Whelan (1982,
diligent"

of the "most
p.43) characterizes the author of the quote, B. P. Mansurov, as one

and "conscientious" Council members.
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going in or out of the Council passed through the
Chancery and

The Chancery functioned

its

pertinent subdivisions.

in this respect as a resource center for
the so-called

supreme

organs (verkhovnye organy) of government.

The

significance of Chancery staff emerges clearly in connection
with Council

procedures. Even though the Chancery served as an auxiliary organ,
point out that

its

it is

significant to

organizational infrastructure was distinct from that of the Council.
The

Chancery was managed by a functionary called the
sekretar'), a direct appointee of the Czar.

The

state secretary

state secretary

(Gosudarstvennyi

was not a Council member,

and his position was independent of the Council. He had the discretion
divisional staff,

As mentioned

which by the 1880s numbered more than double

above. Chancery staff operated

all

the Council. Informally established procedure

would be

dealt with

deliberations.

on a preliminary

Chancery

staff,

basis

that of the Council itself.

business transactions going in and out of

was

that proposals for policy-making

by Council divisional

keeping track of pending deliberations and for recording them
the journals, a so-called

memorandum

the Czar the project under consideration.

debate.

on the debate

it

was responsible

in

in journals (zhumaly).

(memoriia) would be extracted

to

submit to

The memorandum would include an

outline of

had occasioned, and any changes resulting from

According to the channels of

memoranda

After due

Assembly (obshchee sobranie) of

the Council. Within the course of Council procedures. Chancery staff

the project, a report

staff.

versed in adequate legalese, then would go on to transcribe

the preliminary results for presentation to the General

From

to appoint

political

action,

the information provided in

delivered the final stage of input for imperial decision-making.
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that

Influence by Chancery staff on the processing of
legal issues had enormous
potential.

Council members, and even the Czar himself, received
necessary information

on pending projects through the Chancery. Such influence was
literally

all

the greater since

it

was

impossible for individual members of the decision-making arena
to deal

responsibly with the ever-growing volume of business presented for informed
consent.

The

official

policy-making organs, coming

down

to the nitty-gritty of legal drafting

policy-coordination, increasingly relied on Chancery expertise because

its

versed in the techniques of legal transcription and interpretation. As a

staff

result,

and

was
the

Chancery's importance as a power base grew steadily over the course of the nineteenth
century since

it

functioned as the central coordination mechanism that

of legislative affairs through the state apparatus.^'^ The
that increased reliance

tutelage

tendencies

the points

of the matter, however, was

on bureaucratic expert opinion promoted the cause of bureaucratic

by deflecting government

Council towards

cmx

moved

secluded

areas

attention

from informed consent within the State

of executive

undermined the already

fragile

decision.

basis

Of

course,

such political

of quasi-parliamentary

structures.

Bureaucratic influence over policy-making reinforced in this regard already existing
trends of political inequality and procedural uncertainty.

Interface Linkages

As

indicated above, this section of the analysis inquires into institutionally

determined structure of state-societal exchanges. In

to

what extent

particular, an effort is

made

to clarify

in the
societal actors are provided with the opportunity to deliver input

''‘Whelan, 1982, p.46.
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policy-making process. Or, to put
rules the state

To

it

differently,

might have delimited chances for

it is

questionable by what organizational

societal input?

the informed observer the assumption probably
appears puzzling that there

something

like an interface in

Russian pohtics.

To be

is

sure, within state-societal relations,

the term implies the concept of a political arena where both
types of actors meet, state and
societal,

to

engage in

political

interface usually involves a

as formal equality

is

assumed

amve

at a

exchanges. The democratic concept of state-society

two-way communication model conditioned on such

and voluntary cooperation. Based on democratic

that the parties to the

qualities

political traditions,

exchange meet on a somewhat equal footing

it

in order to

mutually beneficial agreement, or contract.

The Russian experience
on a one-way model of

differs

political

society communications, the

from

this

concept substantially because

it is

based

communication. According to the study of basic

state-

image of a self-centered

state

apparatus emerges that

actively restricts the spectrum of chances for societal input. Central to the study of

interface

communications then

image of dual Russia. The

is

the

theme of an enduring

classical texts are

state-society antagonism: the

Herzen (1853) and Tucker (1979), Both

authors share the concept of a culturally entrenched state-society cleavage. Alexander

Herzen created the formula of the "two Russias" by arguing

One

the one hand, there

was governmental,

that:

imperial, aristocratic Russia, rich in

money, armed not

only with bayonets but with the bureaucratic and police techniques taken from Germany. On the
other hand, there was the Russia of the dark people, poor, agricultural, communal, democratic,
helpless, taken

by

surprise, conquered, as

it

were, without battle.^^

Alexander Herzen quoted in Tucker, Robert C. 1971. Soviet Political Mind'. Stalinism and PostStalin Change, revised edition. New York: Norton, here at p.l24.
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Introducing the formula of "dual Russia" into a
larger analytical context, Tucker
creates
the

metaphor of "the image of dual Russia" by observing:

Far from developing as a dependent political 'superstructure'
over the social-economic
Russian state organism took shape as an autonomous force
acting to

'base.' the

create or recreate

social base, to shape

above.

[...]

The

its

and reshape the

institutional pattern of society, in a series
of revolutions
exploitative relation of the state to the society brought
an extension

own
from

of coercive

controls and the hypertrophy of the centralized governmental
system.’*

Similar to Herzen, Tucker conceives likewise high levels of violence

exchanges. The state

It is

pictured as maintaining an exploitative relation vis-a-vis society.

is

understood that the

state

took control of society in a manner of an occupying power

dealing with a conquered populace.

actors

were

in a position of

persists with regard to

in state-society

To be

sure,

it is

historical fact that Russian non-state

extreme disadvantage vis-a-vis

pohcy choice. Rule-making

state actors.

The same

authority traditionally

the sole privilege of the state. State-centered legal authority

pattern

was considered

was exerted

as

"top-down"

approaches towards legislation. Based on a hierarchical understanding of

political

organization, the autocratic regime engaged in a conscious effort to diminish societal

access to policy-making bodies. Thus,

strategy

was

to

it is

maximize control over

emergence of a two-way playing

probably

fair to

argue that the dominant

state-society interactions,

field for pohtical exchanges.

and

To

game

to forestall the

put

it

differently,

control over interface communications and top-down approaches of legislation belong to

the

same game

’*

plan.

Tucker, 1971,p.l23.
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By what organizational

rules did the state delimit chances for
societal input?

Judging on the basis of cultural studies,

managed

would appear

to exert a controlling influence over interface

certain social program.

of social

it

The consequence of

Russian regimes

exchanges by implementing a

social reforms

strata into a state-centered hierarchy

that

would be

the forceful binding

of rank. Intermediate steps included the

establishment of status-defined privileges and duties towards the

state.

High positions

within this system were then rewarded with special privileges and rights
vis-a-vis lowerpositioned class members. Notables and favorites were provided with exploitative
rights
vis-a-vis lower strata

and authoritative protection of those

loyalty of the nobility to the

power

center.

The

Peter the Great in 1722, designed to establish a

the state rather than

An

on

rights in

exchange for absolute

introduction of the Table of Ranks by

strict official

hierarchy based on service to

ancestry, belongs to this category.

especially effective instrument for establishing hierarchies and exploitative

social relations

proved

to

be status-defined property

rights.

The

autocratic

government

abolished by means of "reforms" the principle of previous private property rights

in land

ownership, and granted them thereafter on a conditional basis only to loyal military

officers

and members of the aristocracy. The

of their customary

rights,

in

turn,

aristocracy, encountering the infringement

gained certain exploitative rights vis-a-vis the

peasantry, accomplished through the enslavement of the peasantry as enacted by the 1649

Law Code
to loyal

(Ulozhenie).

members of

The 1649 Code

stipulated that peasants occupying lands granted

the aristocracy and military

became bound

to the land as well as to

For an overview concerning data and "The Structure of the Peasantry, see White, Stephen.
1979. Political Culture and Soviet Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, here at pp.55-63.
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the landlord and the Czar.

The Russian autocracy

strata into state-centered hierarchies

thus succeeded in binding the societal

through the authoritative allocation of land.
Although

Catherine the Great attenuated the concept of conditional
property rights

by establishing the concept of absolute ownership, the law was

in land in

1782

restricted to the nobility.

Whereas

the gentry gained independence from service obligations
to the czar, the

peasants

remained bound to the

compounding

land

and to the

landlord

for

another

century,

the injustice against them. Property rights thus depended on access
to

executive power and the momentary will of the ruler, in contrast to the kind of stable
contractual agreements between

Europe

monarch and

social constituents that occurred in

Western

at this time.^*

Similar tendencies prevailed in the domain of corporate activity where scholarly
refined competence concerning the

management and governance of

confined to the military-bureaucratic

demanded an

input of technological

elite.

new forms

Since

know-how,

it

was

corporations was

of business operations

a natural consequence that the

bureaucratic elite would play a crucial role in Russia's corporate development. The

emerging banking and corporate sector then had
of czarist bureaucrats.

From

little

to

choose but to hire a large number

the Ministry of Finance, 225 bureaucrats held 251 posts in

corporations, mutual credit societies, and other enterprises; thirteen were presidents of

Boards, fifteen were members of Boards, twenty sat on audit commissions, and twenty
served as bookkeepers and other technical personnel.^^ Evgenii

was

vice-director of the State

Bank and

its

White, 1979, pp.41ff.

Owen, 1991,

p.91.
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I.

Lamanskii, for instance,

director (1866-81) after the retirement of

Baron

Stieglitz.

He

also occupied the presidency of the

Volga-Kama Bank

council, the

Russian Bank for Foreign Trade council and was also
a stockholder of the

Moscow

Merchant Bank and a member of the Petersburg Mutual Credit

virtue of

Society.

By

holding these prestigious offices, Lamanskii was able to influence
significantly the design

of emerging corporations, especially in the railway business.
Executive decisions,

how

to

go about corporate business

concentrated in the hands of the imperial bureaucratic
affairs

was

elite.

the technological backwardness of the broad

class. In 1873, Babst, a representative

affairs

and the

like,

A major cause for this

mass of

was

state of

the Russian mercantile

of the "enhghtened" stratum of Merchant Moscow,

addresses this issue expressively by complaining: "Of commercial and industrial

men

with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of contemporary forms of trade and
of banking in particular, there are almost none in Russia."^® To be sure, the stratum of
'enlightened' entrepreneurs that

was open towards Western forms of education and

technological advance was quite small at the turn of the century. Alfred Rieber estimates

the

numerical strength of

this

group to approximately 100 families. The bulk of

merchants remained loyal to traditional customs and beliefs

that,

as

such,

were

antithetical to Westernization.

Owen

demonstrates the natural distrust of innovation typical of the traditional

Moscow Merchant

Quoted

of the period by relating two anecdotes, which are reproduced here to

in T.C.

Rieber, Alfred

Owen, 1991,
J.

p.87.

1982. Merchants and Entrepreneurs

University of North Carolina Press, here at p.421.
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in

Imperial Russia. Chapel

Hill:

give a Uvely image of the situation.*^
to

make use of the newly

They preferred instead

the

new

and converse
building.

reported that

Moscow Merchants were

established stock exchange building, erected in

to trade outside the

amazing since the temperatures were
to stand

It is

in the

snow.

It

new

clearly

November

building. This situation

actually

then required police action to compel them to enter
to its terrace

and

steps, but not to

exchange building! Likewise, Moscow Merchants

have shunned the new railroad

1839.

was even more

below freezing point causing them

However, the merchants moved only

the interior of the stock

reluctant

built

between

St.

Petersburg and

are reported to

Moscow

(1842-51).

Vladimir Alekseev (1795-1862) and several other prominent merchants were summoned
to St. Petersburg to thank the

how

they enjoyed the

trip

Czar for the newly

by

train

built railroad.

and the much shorter

However, the merchants remained mute and embarrassed
irritation the autocrat left the

fear of the train they

had

who made them promise
train alone. In

Bologoe

all

The Czar then asked them

travel period of 14 hours.

to give an answer. After

room. The merchants then confessed
traveled by stagecoach. This

to return to

Moscow by rail. The

station at midpoint,

some

to an aide that out of

was reported

to the

monarch,

next day, Alekseev boarded the

where the southbound and northbound

trains

stopped simultaneously to refuel, Alekseev went off to take some refreshments. Spending

too

much

time at the buffet, he rushed out

at the third bell,

but used the wrong door and

so boarded the northbound train by mistake. In conversation, he soon learned of his

neighbor's destination.

you to Petersburg

is

"How

taking

marvellous!" he exclaimed. "The same train that

me

to

Moscow.

is

taking

Devilishly clever, these Germans!" Confused

and politics in Russia: A social history of the Moscow
merchants, 1855-1905. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, here at p. 15.

Owen, Thomas

C. 1981. Capitalism
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and humiliated because of his blunder, Alekseev
cursed the "gadget",

left the

Petersburg

In the final analysis, asymmetric patterned
allocation of technological

know-how

railroad station,

and rode back

produced two side

to

Moscow on

effects. First, the

to develop a coherent

the stagecoach.

emergence of a genuine business

group identity and socio-political

interests

class strong

enough

independent of the

state

bureaucracy and foreign involvement seemed unlikely. Second,
hierarchically patterned
socio-pohtical organization under the stewardship of the Czarist regime
continued to play
a crucial role in determining the course of business activities.

As

a result, the chance of

bottom-up codification of best practice rules seemed unlikely. The formation of
normative prescriptions governing business

economic development had
this

background,

policies,

The

to

becomes

it

activities as well as the decisive

emanate from the top of the

clear

and institution-building

why

impetus for

political hierarchy. Against

the building of social consensus on economic

in particular, turned out to

state apparatus, functioning as energizer for

with extensive powers to direct and spur social

be such a delicate adventure.

economic development, was provided
activities,

proved counterproductive to the building of commercial law

which, on the other hand,

institutions.

Even though, or

exactly because the top executive could dictate the rules of the game, the project of

institution-building (assuming that there

was such an

intention at all) vanished

from

the

pohtical agenda since both entities, state and society, did not feel compelled to observe

the official policy.

discretionary

The

power

fallacy being that the state apparatus

made

extensive use of

to manipulate existing legislation, while the social base of Russian

merchants and entrepreneurs was not able to emerge from the long shadow of the
breathe

life into

its

the autocratic prescribed rules.
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state to

Corporate

This section will focus on
interest

is

Law

how

Reform. 1858

-

the rules of the

1

S74

game played

out.

Of

whether the asymmetric format of participatory
components

particular

in

effect

prejudiced institutional development. Intermediate analytical
steps involve a process
study of corporate law reform, as

it

became

visible within the reign of

see

how

The

analysis then proceeds to an assessment of de facto participation.

the imperial regime determined business-level preferences

data, the study

comes

is

Alexander
of

On

II.

To

vital interest.

the basis of the

to the tentative conclusion that the hypothetical base line of the

argument will be verified because participatory components appeared

to

have an effective

impact on organizational behavior.

Agenda-Setting

In 1858,

Alexander

II

exercised his discretion to delegate the issue of corporate

law reform to Finance Minister Reutem.

commissioned the task
legislation

to

By

force of imperial discretion,

Reutem was

serve as chairman in the process of reviewing existing

on joint-stock corporations. Thus,

it

was made

reform was part of the regime's agenda. In the interest of

official that corporate

law

this research paper, the question

then arises concerning the kind of inputs that might have affected the decision of the

autocrat. Or, to put

move

it

differently,

what was

the constellation of forces that appeared to

the autocrat to initiate the pertinent policy-making process?

On

the basis of available data,

it

would seem

that the course of events leading to

In
the autocratic decision followed an established procedure of ministerial consultations.

law
accordance with established procedures, the decisive impetus for putting corporate
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reform on the agenda came from Finance Minister
Reutem. To be sure, jurisdictional

competence and economic

self-interest

were

sufficient

motivation for the Finance

Minister to push the agenda of corporate law reform. Reform was
of immediate interest to

him

since an expanding

company

sector

would enhance

the tax extraction facility of his

ministry and therefore underline the utility and prestige of his bureaucratic
domain.

It is

significant to point out, however, that such calculus played a rather limited
role in this

particular case.

According to available

Finance Minister, especially his

data,

initiative

it

seems

that the personal features of the

and standing power, exerted a determining

influence on the course of events.

Societal support for this cause, to the surprise of the unsuspecting observer,

from the

intelligentsia rather than

came

from business groups. Looking towards Western

Europe, members of the intelligentsia came to appreciate the
general and the role of a law-based state in particular.

To be

liberal political ideas in

sure, such ideas

were very

appealing to an audience that was accustomed to the vacillations of an arbitrary operating
imperial bureaucracy. With the solemn intent to put an end to arbitrary government a

new

consciousness was advocated. In the field of company organization, such ambition

translated into

advocacy for the abolition of the concession system. To outhne

essential points of criticism that

"important speech" of

Pakhman demanded
Speaking

at

were alive within the

Semen Pakhman (Pachmann).*^

the abolition of the

many

p.57.
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A

Owen

refers to an

leading proponent for reform,

"formalities" of the

Kharkov University, Pakhman emphasized

Owen, 1991,

intelligentsia,

the

1836

legislation.

in particular the benefits of "the

principle of freedom for joint-stock activity." In the

same

Pakhman

spirit,

criticized the

ubiquitous tendency of the bureaucracy to function as a
"yoke" to the Russian people.
Particularly disturbing, criticized

effect

Pakhman, was

on the capacity of economic

industry, in the

the state tutelage because of

to hope, to expect,

and

everything from the government, while the people remain inactive, having

should

be

adverse

actors to take care of business. State tutelage
over

words of Pakhman, "teaches the people

to think about itself.

its

to

demand

lost the ability

Progress in the affairs of corporate governance, he suggested,

through

attained

"open

discussion"

(glasnost)

and

"responsibility"

QC

(otvetstvennost).

As

it

turned out. Finance Minister

Reutem himself showed

interest in the

new

ideas of glasnost. Reutem, consulting regularly with the enlightened stratum of Russian
society, then took the initiative to

push the reform agenda. To be

sure, within

government

only a relatively small circle of proponents supported the ideal of glasnost, which,
following

in the

decades of reform and counter-reform, were steam-rolled by the more

conservative majority. The policy exchanges between

intelligentsia

represented

characteristics.

To show an open-minded

certainly not the

a

situation-related

derogation

from

overall

no systemic pressure

how

for top bureaucrats to

in T.C.

Owen, 1991,

of the

system

attitude towards liberal segments of society

dominant game strategy of the imperial bureaucracy. Thus,

within Reutem's discretion to decide

Quoted

Reutem and members

it

was

largely

to deal with societal inputs because there

embrace

p.57.

Ibid.
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societal concerns.

was

was

Policy-Formulation
In February 1861, the Ministry of Finance
initiated the process of policy-making,

presenting a

bill

one hundred paragraphs long ready

for inter-ministerial discussion.

It

mainly consisted of a somewhat balanced approach towards
reform. Greater economic

freedoms were promised through the abandonment of

unnamed
remain

restriction

shares, while the concession system, the genuine

in force. In addition,

it

stipulated that a

on future contracts and

bone of contention, was

sworn statement indicating

to

that one-fifth

of the necessary capital had already been raised was to accompany each corporate charter
submitted

for

ministerial

approval.

The

official

justification

for

restrictive

measures was to protect the public from the unpleasant side

economic

self-interest.

The

draft

continuing

effects of

such

unguided

law then entered the stage of politico-bureaucratic debate where various

ministries and agencies produced commentaries on this proposal between February 1861

and February 1865. The Ministry of Internal
standards on

minimum

Affairs, for instance, sought to

impose higher

capital required for incorporating joint ventures in order to

discourage the proliferation of small, "weak firms" and to "limit speculation;" so went the

official justification.^^

reform

bill

Reutem, however, refused

to include these provisions into the

because the signs of an unbroken police mentality on the part of the Ministry

of Internal Affairs emerged as
Societal Input

solicited opinions

I.

all

too obvious from

The government,

its

comments.

to the surprise of the "informed" observer, also

from business organizations.

Historical records of submitted opinions,

however, exist only from two business organizations: the Riga Exchange Committee and

Owen, 1991,

p.67.
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the

semibureaucratic"

(MEC).

Moscow

In its opinion,

Riga

sections of the manufacturing and commercial
councils

criticized the one-fifth rule, while

Muscovite merchants

favored the issuance of preferred shares, which would carry a
preferential right to

The Ministry of Finance,

dividends.

it

considered

expediency,

it

it

as expected, rejected the advice

worthwhile to adopt the Muscovite proposal. For reasons of analytical

appears worthwhile to mention that existing bonds of political patronage

might have played into the hands of the

MEC.

leadership of Naidenov (1877-1905), were

stratum of corporate Russia

hierarchy of court politics.

diplomatic

from Riga; however,

repertoire

who

Muscovite merchants, especially under the

known

to

make up

the

more conservative

better appreciated their traditional place within the

Moscow Merchants were more

fortunate in playing on the

of the times by conveniently engaging in behind-the-scenes

negotiations and performing the proper rituals of due respect to the dominant system of

autocratic-bureaucratic rule and the like. Representatives of the Baltic region, on the other

hand, were

political

•

known

affairs,

•

opposition.

for their rather straightforward approach towards business which, in

must have conveyed connotations of undesired provocation and

88

For details on the

MEC,

see

Owen, 1991,

pp.66ff; Rieber, 1982, pp. 103-1 11.

Naidenov must have constituted the archetype of conservatism within the arena of Russian
organizational business life. Owen (1991, p. 102) describes him as a personality who integrated the diverse
of his times. As such, he was well known to be capable of demonstrating
financial
"absolute devotion" to the Czar, while, at the same time, pushing his own agenda of "prudent
Tsitovich
the
policies." At the occasion of another bureaucratically orchestrated reform conference,
alone
Comission (1897-99), Naidenov rendered an infallible proof of his conservatism when he opposed,
to
memorandum
a
among the merchants in the empire, the principle of incorporation by registration. In
a
launch
banks
to
warned that the introduction of the new system would lead the great

cultural

and

Witte, the

political streams

MEC

p.l47). Thus, what
multitude of "small companies with inexpensive, unnamed shares" (Owen 1991,
perceived as a threat by
appeared to liberal segments of corporate Russia as a legitimate reform goal was

Witte era.
the most influential organization of Russian manufacturers in the
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Bureaucratic Deliberations

I.

The unwished-for

of the Baltic business

fate

opinion, however, turned out to be futile against the
background of a politico-bureaucratic

machine

that

seemed

to spin endlessly. Since the process of
bureaucratic deliberations

took on Kafkaesque proportions, the Czar himself considered

it

necessary to step in

repeatedly and urge the bureaucracy to process the issue swiftly.
The State Council,

operating as the focal point of policy coordination, however, withstood
these reprimands.
Instead, the Council insisted

on sending the

bill to the

Ministry of Justice since the matter

of reform was deemed particularly significant. The Minister of
I.

Palen, and his subordinates then

made

Justice,

Count Konstantin

a multitude of amendments and counterproposals

that mostly questioned the bill in its entire form. Palen offered detailed proposals for

revision of fifty-six of

its

revision" of the statutes

proposed for

this

ninety-nine articles. In addition, he called for a "fundamental

on

full

and limited partnerships

purpose to send the

Council considered

it

bill to the State

in the previous years

necessary to open a

1870, bureaucratic deliberations

came

new round

by September

feedback was registered.

1.

It

To

amendments

were so sweeping

to the bill.

that the State

of deliberations. Finally, in February

to a temporary halt

approval to the State Council's proposal to publish the

the public

Council in November 1869,

to accept the generality of Palen's

However, the revisions made

law of 1836 and

corporations for comments.

bill to all existing

Finance Minister Reutem, then, returned the

and signaled his readiness

as well as the

bill

when Alexander n gave
and

to solicit

his

comments from

the surprise of the officials, however, no significant

was suggested

that manufacturers
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and investors "had grown

dazed from watching the bureaucratic carousel of

drafting, debating,

and delay

in the

previous nine years.

Formulations n. After the
to

first

attempt failed, a second major effort was mounted

produce a new law subsequent to the deadline of September
1870. The newly

estabhshed commission composed of

officials

from the Ministries of

Transportation, Justice, and Foreign Affairs was chaired by Aleksander

Department of Trade and Manufacturing

in

the

Internal Affairs,

I.

Butovskii of the

Ministry of Finance.

commission members, the economist Fedor Gustavovich Temer

One

(originally

of the

Thdmer

in

German), stressed the importance of entrepreneurship and

that of individual initiative for

economic development. Temer was obviously taking up

ideas of glasnost as

had aired them before. Emphasizing the capacity of self-government,
for

as has

Western European legal-economic developments, Temer advocated

of clear legal guidehnes.

maximum

He

been crucial

the establishment

suggested that entrepreneurs should be endowed with a

of freedom in which to pursue their businesses as long as they respected the

law and registered with the relevant

unnamed

Pakhman

authorities.

He

especially endorsed the legahzation of

shares in order to facilitate the free circulation of stock,

the extension of credit in the Russian

in corporate activity

The

bill

deemed supportive of

economy. Otherwise, he argued,

would only damage

state interference

the prospects for economic growth.

produced by the commission was the

first in

Russia to advocate for a

streamlined system of registration according to European standards of corporate law.

Companies, according to the

draft law,

were considered

general assembly approved the charter;

Owen, 1991,

all

legally incorporated

once the

first

shares were sold and at least one-tenth fully

p.68.
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paid for, with the corporation registered

at the

Ministry of Finance. For potentially risk-

seeking enterprises, in particular banks and brokerage
businesses, and projects of national
significance, such as railroad companies, the law

keeping up parts of the concession system. In

this

mandated an exemption
way, "potentially

to the rule

fragile entities"

by

had

to

obtain ministerial, but not imperial, approval. Apart from
dismantling parts of the

concession system, the reform framework included procedural safeguards

to protect

minority shareholders. The reform proposal stipulated that owners of only 1/10
of the

company's shares could convene a special meeting of the assembly. Further, anyone

owning
cast

percent of the stock must be allowed to vote; and no individual could

at least 1

more than

half of the votes. Because of these detailed and qualitatively

norms, the reform framework swelled in size to 194
then granted a provisional approval of the

bill

articles.

on April

new

legal

The Ministry of Finance

6,

1872.

The

inclusion of

procedural safeguards, however, certainly signaled that the carousel of bureaucratic
deliberations

was

rotating at another level.

The

Societal Input n.

public for comments.

thirty

upon

The commission, within

them providing

comments was

incorporation

emphasized

by
that

a

welcoming

registration.

it

insights

to the

a half-year period, received approximately

from the business point of view.

attitude

Surprisingly,

doom

vis-a-vis

even

the

valued highly the principle of

Committee focused on minor points because
might

was submitted

provisional approval,

its

commentaries on the law from newspapers, exchange committees, and other

groups, each of

these

bill,

the reform.

The Petersburg

it

hoped

the

Riga

proposed

Exchange

registration.

(in vain) to

In

its

Common
principle

of

Committee
critique,

the

avoid a long debate that

business representatives, in the same
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to

spirit.

praised the effort of the Butovskii

Commission

"to

remove from

legislation all tutelage

over the pubhc."^° However, there was also
agreement among the multitude of business
opinions that the reform

Owen

bill

accounts for a few

was

still

critical inputs that stand

Golos (The Voice), for instance,
stipulation

to perpetuate various

out from the

criticized article
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registration certificate at

any time

if

It

to

annul a company's

the

opinion,

a veritable

"sword of

registered in the empire. Another sensible

came from Torgovyi Sbornik (The Commercial
Industrial Society at that time.

The newspaper

inaccurate statements were found in the original

Such a procedure placed, so was

Damocles" over every corporation

rest.’'

obviously a typical Russian

by which the finance minister was empowered

-

application.

forms of bureaucratic tutelage.

comment

Reporter), the newspaper of the Russian

criticized the lack of an appeal procedure for rejected

applications.

Bureaucratic Deliberations n. The commission then proceeded to review the

comments of

the business organizations in thirty-six

more

sessions.

To what

extent the

bureaucrats might have considered the business opinions in their periodic consultation

remains uncertain on the basis of the existing database.
Petersburg critique was not included in the final

Owen

draft.

merely indicates

that the

Presumably, the autocratic

principle of secretive deliberations remained untouched by ideas of glasnost. Apart from

these

traditional

conclusion

when

ambiguities,

bureaucratic

deliberations

reached

the Ministry of Finance approved the draft law in

’“Owen, 1991,

p.73.
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Ibid.
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their

preliminary

March 1874. This

version, 198 articles long,

bill

was forwarded

underwent a few changes

that

to the State

showed

Council for

who

this

process was a detailed

There, the

the determination of the conservative elite to

ensure the principles of bureaucratic control over business

outcome of

final editing.

list

The most

activities.

notable

of punishments to be imposed on managers

violated either the general law or the corporate charter.

These

efforts again turned out to

be

futile

when Finance

Minister Reutem, on the

very eve of final approval, precipitously abandoned the Butovskii

reform

bill

had approached the

final stages

Europe (1873), leaving Russian

bill.

At

when

the

of editing, a stock market panic broke out

the CzcU' himself endorsed the repudiation of the Butovskii

bill

on corporate development. The emperor wrote

December 1874,

and implemented further

that

new

corporate charters

should be approved only "with extreme caution." This policy was further highlighted

August

1877,

circumstances."

when

new

in

legislators in disarray concerning the cause of reform.

Czarist policy makers were so alarmed by the stock-market crisis that, in

restrictions

a time

companies

approved

were

"only

under

in

exceptional
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Participation Levels

In contrast to the ideals of glasnost,

it

is

probably

fair to say that

have
eventually wrecked because a genuine political process that would

totality

reform was

moved

the

coherence, or even
of singular wants and preferences into the direction of

bespoke the incapacity of
consensus, was missing. Instead an organizational process that
a coherent legal framework existed.
the regime to integrate diverse policy choices into

Owen, 1991,

p.77.
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On

the contrary, the discussed material clearly indicates
that the organizing principle of

reform was rarely

it

efficient, or politically expedient.

must appear puzzhng why,

start over,

in 1870, the Butovskii

For example, to the neutral observer

commission deemed

even though substantial groundwork had been done

it

necessary to

in the previous nine years

of reform.

Scope of
were invited

social input chances.

To be

sure,

even though business organizations

to provide their input at various instances of the reform cycle, their prospects

of having a decisive impact on policy tended to be marginal. As indicated above, opinions
of business organizations were sohcited but not accounted for by the authorities
final draft proposal. Sheltered

seeming sessions

to discuss

these drafting sessions

was

from

in the

the public, policy experts were meeting in endlessly

and draft the legal framework.

A common

the production of legal output that

entrepreneurial inputs. For obvious reasons,

it is

denominator of

would discard most of

therefore delicate to

make an

the

accurate

assessment of the situation since the available database about these quasi-secretive
sessions leaves

business

it

largely uncertain

opinions.

considered

at

all.

It

remains

Russian

what

criteria the drafters utilized to discard the lot

of

even questionable whether business opinions were

business

representatives

for

their

part

showed

their

determination to utilize the official invitation to openly discuss their dissatisfaction with

the

still

enforced 1836 legislation.

To be

sure, opinions

were submitted with due respect

without openly attacking the principle of autocratic governance.

One major

reason for reform failure was the dominant position of the imperial

parUamentary
bureaucratic elite within the legislative procedure, which, in the absence of

oversight,

was delegated

the task to

come up with recommendations
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for policy design.

The bureaucratic

elite clearly

imposed a pivotal

more obvious case involves

the

State

role in the organization of reform.

Council

that

preserved

its

The

discretion,

in

contravention of the official time frame, to prolong the process
of inter-ministerial
deliberations and to send the Butovskii bill to Konstantin Palen.
in turn, called for a

"fundamental revision" of the

The Minister of
Although

statutes.

this

Justice,

kind of

organizational behavior might appear self-defeating, one could interpret this sort of

bureaucratic action as an effective indicator for the pivotal role of the bureaucracy within
the policy-making process. Accordingly, bureaucratic

of

its

discretion to

agenda

make

power becomes

counter-reform proposals or to

that, in the final analysis,

make amendments

would contravene the emergence of a

solution. Equally, the discretion of the top bureaucrats to decide

halt or to start over again

emphasizes

when

means

to the official

politically viable

to bring reform to a

their controlling influence over the organization of

institutional reform. In particular the decision of the

after informal consultations

specified by

Finance Minister to abandon reform

with personages outside the

official cabinet underlines his

capacity to interfere, in the style of an elevated autocrat, into the legislative process as he

sees

fit.

Bargaining Logic.

reform was,

the

is

political

More important

the question of

how

know who

the

the bureaucratic elite utilized

organization of reform.

main

its

Within the exercise of

government agencies took an ambivalent

would compromise the search

than to

culprit of failed

leverage to influence

their

responsibilities,

role towards society that, in the final analysis,

for a viable political solution.

suggested that the imperial bureaucracy, far from organizing the
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On

the contrary,

it

efficient allocation

is

of

business-level preferences, operated in a general state
of detachment from societal

concerns.

Indicative of this trend are the

many

instances in which the authorities requested

business organizations to deliver input without, however, granting them
significant
attention afterwards. Certainly,

one of the main concerns of the imperial bureaucracy was

to keep intact the traditional foundations of the regime in general, and the
state-centered

framework of status-defined

privileges in particular.

To

this end,

it

was

prohibitive for

government agencies

to provide entrepreneurial

would have dehvered

effective participatory components. Instead, the overriding calculus

groups with a context of action, which

of Russian bureaucratic politics was to impose on the pohtical process an asymmetric
order of participatory entitlements, preferentially allocated to the higher stratum of

Russian officialdom.

To be

independently formulating

of

rule.

To

sure, the

its

interests

emergence of a strong economic base capable of

would have posed a

threat to the traditional

system

avert this scenario, the imperial bureaucracy relied on strategies of political

organization,

which would prevent the public from having equal access

making process. Intermediate measures included
decision-making,

tactics

of political patronage, secrecy in

and a general preference for behind-the-scenes negotiations. The

unheard-of fate of legitimate issues of business, such

as, the

procedure appears to confirm the use of these

To be

participation

was not an

official policy

to the policy-

tactics.

issue within the bureaucratic

elite.

demand

for an appeal

sure, effective pohtical

Instead,

it

appears that the

of soliciting societal input was more of instrumental value for the pohtical

elite.
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Outcome

Common
bureaucratic

to these

developments was the

regimentation

remained

governance. The Russian pohtical

elite

fact that the autocratic

prominent

was

within

political

Thanks

arena.

participation, the autocratic

to

domain

in the position to prescribe

scope of corporate business activities because of

domestic

the

the

its

untouched

impulse and
of

corporate

and delimit the

dominant position within the
principle

of

regime was in the position to hold on

status-defined

to the concession

system for incorporation. With the aid of such a system the Russian autocracy exerted
an
effective veto right over corporate

particular.

When

the

ethnic

development and the idea of self-government

composition

of the

stakeholders

inspired

motivated counter-arguments the bureaucracy could simply refuse to pass

it

in

religiously

to the higher

echelons of power. The government was therefore provided with the capacity to mold any
corporation in

the Czar.

its

own image

The bestowal of

since every corporate charter had to be signed personally by

"favors" falls into the

same category since

it

emphasizes the

discretion of the imperial bureaucracy to intervene in favor of a particular request, or to

neglect

it.

Under

the system of autocratic favors, a particular group of individuals, the so-

called "financial oligarchs" distinguished itself from the

mass of Russian entrepreneurs by

taking advantage of the institutional communication rules.

Their avenue to business

success usually involved activities in the railroad construction business, which enjoyed a

full-scale

boom

during the second half of the nineteenth century with (government

guaranteed) high rates of return and other forms of state support. Crucial for success.

See, for example, Petrov, Jurij A. 1996. "Formen, Typen und Besonderheiten des russischen
vorrevolutionaren Untemehmertums, in Russlands untemehmerische Vergangenheit: ein Wegweiser in die

Zukunft?, pp. 31-52.
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however, was to establish close 'working

relations' to the higher

echelons of bureaucracy

in order to receive favorable concessions, terms of contract and cheap credits.

The

brothers Samuil and Lazar Poljakov, descendants from a Jewish merchant, for instance,
established unusually close connections with the Minister for Post and Telegraphy, Count
Tolstoj,

and to turn

it

into a favorable railroad construction concession.

Using a

fair

amount of cunning and good business

instincts

of several railroad corporations.

reported that Samuil disposed over an enormous

capital

worth 30 billion rubles

It is

[sic?] at the

Samuil succeeded

in

time of his death in

becoming

1888.^'^

the

owner

This wealth,

however, as contemporaries noted, was due to the shabby quality of railroads constructed
under his control. The stakes of doing business in Russia were therefore disproportional
high for individuals not connected to the imperial chancellery or any favorite of the Czar.

The

autocratic regime discriminated in this respect between

state hierarchy,

and individuals outside the

official hierarchy

the political patronage.

Ibid., at

members of upper

page 43.

67

levels of

without adequate access to

CHAPTER 4

TRANSFORMATIVE STATE CAPACITY IN THE NEW RUSSIA
To

assess the transformative capacity of the Russian polity after
the

fall

of the

Soviet Union, the ensuing discourse inquires into the institutional bases
of Russian

reform

politics.

Because of

its

institutional orientation, the study focuses

of participation and interaction. The present analysis of Russian reform
in this regard a correlation

capacity to transform

between the variables of

embedded

social

institutional variables the analysis focuses

this context the analysis covers the

behaviors.

institutional

on the variables

politics conceives

arrangement and the

To examine

the

significance

of

on the issue of corporate law reform. Within

time frame of the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1992

-

2000). In tracing Yeltsinite reform politics, the analysis concludes that the presidential
apparatus did in effect duplicate elements of pre-democratic governance. The utilization

of such,

it is

argued,

economic reform

would eventually

policy. Its

infringe

upon

its ability

to

conduct an effective

low transformative capacity materializes,

in this respect, in

Soviet-type continuities of corporate governance caused by the resistance of Russian

general directors to adapt their behaviors and orientations to the

Institutional

With

new

legislation.

Arrangement

the intent to insulate government agency from societal resistance, the

presidential apparatus

emerged

to

implement a

series of institutional reforms that

would

eventually increase the scope for political maneuvering and tactical moves. Institutional

reforms included a

set

of policy instruments and action channels that would marginalize

the role of constitutional organs of legislative activity.
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As

a related strategy, the

Presidency would take steps to disenfranchise and undercut Soviet-type
organizations.

The

resulting alienation of

communist-based groups was

network of personal friends and

favorites, the

refers in this context to the delicate

arrangements

that, in fact,

web of

to

be counterbalanced by a loyal

new "Kremlin

Oligarchy." The analysis

"court politics" and extra-constitutional

revolved around the Yeltsin family.

Inter-Branch Relations

Within the

of government, entitlements to affect policy design have the

affairs

tendency to cluster around the presidential apparatus. To maximize
Yeltsin Presidency

made

and action channels

its

influence, the

substantial efforts to institutionalize a set of policy instruments

that

would eventually diminish

the constitutional principle of

parliamentary sovereignty. Recent studies have in this respect highlighted the systemic

conflict

between the elective nature of the presidency, on the one hand, with

the

requirement of democratic legitimization for governmental power, and the autocratic
character of that very power, on the other hand.^^

Newly

established

freedoms of parliamentary sovereignty

(Article

94)

are

diminished by tendencies of power concentration within the executive branch of

government.

A common point of reference

Constitution.

The presidency, according

delivers in this respect Article

90 of the 1993

to this stipulation, has the prerogative to

assume

Shevtsova interviewed in Trud, June 18, 1999, as translated in The Current Digest of the
Power in Russia.
Post-Soviet Press Vol.51, No.24, p.9. See also Eugene Huskey. 1999. Presidential
Transition
Armonk, NY: Sharpe; Virginie Coulloudon. 2000. "The Divided Russian Elite: How Russia’s
Executive
"The
2000.
Produced a Counter-Elite," in Building the Russian State, pp.67-87; M. Steven Fish.
Lilia

in Building the Russian State,
Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics,"

pp. 177- 192.
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legal authority in policy areas,

which have not undergone parliamentary

According to Article 90 the President

empowered

is

to issue decrees

are in force throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

the President to establish the legal basis

may

pursue

its

The decree powers

that

entitle

upon which the executive branch of government

his choice of affairs in against parliamentary resistance.

especially effective instrument that

dissolve the State

and directives

Moreover, the presidency disposes over the procedural means by

policy.

which he may expedite

An

regulation.

Duma. Intended

as a

emerged was

the presidential discretion to

check on presidential power, the constitution

prescribes that the President needs parliamentary approval for his latest choice with

respect to the affairs of government. Additional features stipulate that the President has
the option to dissolve the State

Duma

if it rejects his

times. Article 111 states: "After the State

Duma

candidate for Prime Minister three

rejects three candidates to the office of

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation,

the President of the Russian

Federation shall appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation,

dissolve the State

Duma, and

call

new

elections."

Designed

as

an unlikely exit strategy,

such entitlement was utilized as a very powerful bargaining chip within the course of the
Yeltsin

Presidency.

Yeltsin

made

extensive

usage of the threat of parliamentary

dissolution to force the deputies to submit to his will by approving his budget, confirming

his latest choice for premier,

that

and the

like.

Yeltsin clearly demonstrated, on the other hand,

he could change Prime Ministers four times between March 1998 and August 1999.

Sacrificing

unpopular ministers enabled Yeltsin to defuse the rising
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hostility

of

Parliament and the nation.

As Huskey

put

"Like a seated beast, following each sacrifice

it:

the parliament lost for a time the will to stalk the
executive,
State

Duma

on

deputies,

their

impeachment procedure against the
President Boris Yeltsin,

were not able

President.

remove

To be

to

mount an

effective

Despite several attempts to impeach

members of Parliament would

complexities of the legal procedure.
virtually impossible to

turf,

eventually

succumb

sure, according to the letter of the

a Russian President

from

92 of the Russian Constitution, two-thirds of the State

office.

As

to the

law

it is

established in Article

Duma must

vote to charge him

with high treason or "some other grave crime." These charges must be validated by the

Supreme and Constitutional Courts.

In addition, two-thirds of the Federation Council

must vote

months of the fihng of the

to

By

remove him within

three

formalizing such power asymmetries,

1993 Constitution had been tailored

to the

it

charges.^^

seems reasonable

to argue that the

persona of Boris Yeltsin. Liha Shevtsova, for

instance, contends that the constitutional

framework had been designed

domination" by Boris Yeltsin and his close entourage.

The personal

to

"ensure

characteristics of

Boris Yeltsin seemed conspicuously close to this rationale. That Yeltsin had an obvious

weakness for presenting himself as the new Czar and the single pohtical force able
protect

democracy

in the

Russian lands underscores

this

rationale.

To

to

notice Lilia

Huskey, 1999, p.l70.

The most recent impeachment procedure was instituted on 15 April 1999. One of the five counts
of impeachment included the charge that Yeltsin was to be held responsible for the shelling of the White
House in 1993. This is the most notorious charge leveled against Yeltsin in subsequent indictments
generally promoted by the Communist Party. None of the charges, however, passed the first hurdle in the
State Duma to get the required 300 votes. For details see The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
’’

Vol.51,No.20,pp.l-5.
Shevtsova, 1999, p.279.
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Shevtsova: Yeltsin's tremendous power
circle

-

-

and, equally important, the influence of
his

have accentuated some of his undemocratic

characteristics.

Those close

to

him

have often encouraged him to think of himself as Czar
Boris (1999, p.275)."^^ As
corollary, he

may have

Parliamentary efforts to
sure,

amend

the Constitution

any type of amendment would impair

democracy.

To quote

block extremists.

who

perceived any restriction on his presidential powers as an

It

were repudiated on a routine

way of those who

cannot abide a free press, and

ownership and a free market."

who

insult.

basis.

To be

his capacity to act as the patron of Russian

Boris Yeltsin directly: "The Constitution

stands in the

a

are

is

what enables us

to

sowing hatred and ethnic discord,

are trying to

deny us the right

Boris Yeltsin considered

it

to private

as politically expedient to

maintain the extensive powers of the presidency in order to defend newly established

freedoms. The Russian transition has in

this respect

been marked by the use of

patterns of political authority. Indicative of the implied personalism, however,

that

everything depended on his persona of being the President.

amendments because he apparently considered

his

own

traditional

is

the fact

Yeltsin resisted

personahty to be the central

safeguard of Russian democracy. For obvious reasons, political analysis, therefore, tends

to label the

1993 framework as the "Yeltsin Constitution."

By

the

same

token, what

Shevtsova, 1999, p.275.

Duma

Obviously, the bones of contention were parliamentary efforts to amend the constitution. State
deputies, stirred up by the recurrent government reshuffles, sought to amend the constitution in order

powers of the Presidency. Yelena Mizulina (Yabloko), for instance, launched an initiative in
July 1998, wherein she proposed to simplify the procedure for impeaching the President. For details, see
Sergei Aksyonov. "State Duma Storms Constitution," Kommersant-Daily, July 1, 1998, p.3, as translated in
to delimit the

The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.26,

p.l

1.

Natalya Timakova. "Don't Hold Your Breath," Kommersant, December
translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.50, p.l4f.
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15, 1998, pp.lf, as

Yeltsin did not account for

the fact that the constitutional

is

framework could provide a

Trojan horse for dictatorial ambitions. This scenario could
become especially relevant

member of an

extremist"

party

should win the presidential elections. In such a

circumstance, the Constitution would deliver the means necessary
to
decree. Yeltsin

s

if a

roll

back reform by

grasp of the situation reveals that he was very positive about himself
to

act as the President.

Action Channels

The
State

Duma

ability

of the presidency to generate support for his legislative agenda in the

has been further advanced by a network of bureaucratic support structures.

Eugene Huskey accounts

in this respect for three action channels that

employed by the President.

The

first is

the

became

Domestic Policy Administration, which

informs the President of the correlation of political forces in Parliament while
time trying to convince deputies of the advantages of the legislative

president.

The second

institution

bills,

at the

same

initiatives

of the

comprises the presidential representatives to the

Duma

and Federation Council. These operational units oversee the movement of a
drafting in the executive to

regularly

its final

bill

from

its

approval in Parliament. In addition, for important

the leader of the Executive Office of the President also assigns a high-ranking

government

official to "bulldog" the bill

The most

crucial institutional

assisting the President to

manage

through the two houses.

support

is

delivered by the Executive Office

the flow of legal documents in and out of his office.

Huskey, 1999, pp.l72f.
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Established in

1993, the Executive Office brings under one organizational roof
a

disparate group of presidential agencies, ranging from the State-Legal
Administration and

Monitoring Administration to the analytical centers serving
President.

Huskey

at

the discretion of the

indicates that the organizational structure of the Executive Office

defies a clear demarcation in the lines of competency. Accordingly,

it is

stated that the

Executive Office never succeeded in establishing clear vertical lines of authority or
horizontal lines of jurisdiction between offices.^®^ In addition,

its

many

subdivisions

enjoy different degrees of autonomy and access to the President. As a

result,

the

Executive Office developed into a massive institution with forty-three bureaus and two

thousand professional

staff

members. Of great significance

for legislative procedure

State-Legal Administration that advises the President on legal matters.

key gatekeeper

in the legislative process,

It

whether shepherding executive

is

the

functions as a

bills

through

Parliament, advising the President on the appropriate response to legislative vetoes, or

drafting and reviewing decrees for the President's signature.

The Presidency,
itself as

patterned upon traditional concepts of legal authority, presents

the dominant player within the Russian political realm

discretion to affect policy design and to

endowed with

the

outmaneuver parliamentary opposition. With the

aid of an expansive support apparatus, the President has a wide range of options to

influence policy choice. Such an arrangement seems troublesome with regard to aspects

of institution-building and capacity.

For

details, see

Huskey, 1999, pp.58ff.

Eugene. 1995. The
For a detailed discussion of the State-Legal Administration, see Huskey,
Vol.l
1, No.2, pp.l 15-143.
Post-Soviet
Affairs,
State-Legal Administration and the Politics of Redundancy,"
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Interface Linkages

Access to "Czar Boris": Societal schemes of participation
tend
culturally

web of

embedded modus

analysis refers in this context to the delicate

'court politics" and extra-constitutional arrangements that
revolved around the

Yeltsin family. In

capitalize

of

The

operand!.

to follow the

its

pursuit of reform politics, the Yeltsin Presidency appeared
to

on a personalized type of entitlement

volatility

and procedural

inequality.

To

that corresponds in this regard to features

provide a systemic account of the issue,

however, requires some improvisation, since emerging patterns of bargaining and
participation in policy design continue to be a

institutionalized

input

structure

may

in

this

work

in progress.

The absence of an

respect render only the most general

pattern.

A politicized account of the Yeltsin regime was tendered by former Prime Minster
Yevgeny Primakov.

In an

open

letter to the President,

concern on the part of the presidential apparatus for the

We feel

compelled

to write to

Primakov

affairs

it

of society, to wit:

you because we are seriously concerned about the

Russia on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections.

group of individuals close to

criticized a lack of

have essentially been put

turning the state into a hostage to

its

interests

[...]

The

state

in charge of the country,

and actions, while your

of

affairs in

presidential staff and a

political

and

this

group

is

and informational

from the people who elected you is increasing. The Russian Federation government
sometimes becomes a mere game piece- in your inner circle's games.

isolation

To be
of civil society are

sure, volatility of input options is likely to continue for
still

underdeveloped; see, for instance,

M. Steven

Fish,

some time since the societal bases
Democracy from Scratch, 1995;

on entrepreneurial organizations see Lohr, Eric. 1993. "Arkady Volksy's Political Base,"
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.45, No. 5, pp. 818-837; McFaul, Michael. 1993. "Russian Centrism and
for studies

Revolutionary Transition," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.9, No.3, July-September, pp. 196-223; Rudkin, Charles.
1996. "The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs: Professional Association or Political Party?

The Role of Employers' Associations

in Post-Soviet Russia,"

Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.74,

No.4, pp. 640-657.

"A Small Group of Individuals
Yakovlev

to the President of Russia.

Is

Abusing

Kommersant,

its

Position," Letter

from Primakov, Luzhkov and
The Current Digest of

Oct.29, 1999, p.2, as translated in

the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51, No.43, p.l4.
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The underlying

pretext of the open letter

President and the pressing question of
nature of the letter

may

was

the deteriorating health condition of the

who would

eventually replace him.

is

exchange

relations.

namely

At a more general

level,

indicative of the problem of insularity and the formation of particularistic

More
latter point.

political

in this regard explicate the conspiracy theory involved,

the allegation that "the state" has been turned into a "hostage."
the letter

The

carefully crafted assessments of the Russian political situation confirm the

Hans-Henning Schroder,

for instance, argues that;

Proximity of financial and business circles to the executive and intertwining with the institutions
relevant for

making decisions was

characteristic of the [Yeltsinite,

W.T.]

political system. Parties,

associations or lobbies representing the will of large groups of society and giving these a political

voice were
[...]

still

underdeveloped. Thus, society as a whole was excluded from the

Consequently,

it

political process in

was not

the consolidation of

Russia but the deformation of the

elections and the constitution

political process.

was the central focus of the
presidential democracy legitimated by

democracy

by incorporating commercial

that

interests

into the

actions of the

executive.'®’

The

New Kremhn

Ohgarchy. The group of individuals and business

high proximity to the Yeltsin Presidency came to be

"Boyars."

known

circles with

as the "Oligarchy" or the

Informal entitlement schemes are endemic features of

this particular

kind of

Schroder, Hans-Henning. 1999. "El’tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Groups in
Russian Politics Between 1993 and July 1998," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.6, pp.957-988, here at
pp.980f.

The group of "boyars" includes Boris Berezovsky of LogoVaz (automobiles, television, oil);
Roman Abramovich of Sibneft (protege of Berezovsky), Mikhail Friedman of the Alfa Group (oil, tea,
Gusinsky of Media-Most
sugar, cement); Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Ros-Prom (banking, oil); Vladimir
(banking), Vladimir
SBS-Agro
of
Smolensky
Mikhail
estate);
real
banking,
newspapers,
(television,
Group
Potanin of Uneximbank (banking, real estate,

Inkombank (banking,

metals,

oil

and gas, media, ferrous metals); Vladimir Vinogradov of

oil).
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exchange relationship. The Yeltsin regime was actively
involved

in the creation of this

type of support group.

An

essential contribution to the

emergence of oligarchic

the Kremlin turned over state budget

money

for

structures occurred

when

commercial management. After

the

collapse of the Soviet Union the existing financial structures
had to be rejuvenated
without, however, disrupting the established networks. With the backing
of the political
leadership,

turn, the

to

new

private banks"

newly emerging banking

buy up Russian

industry.

A

mushroomed with
elite

state-provided capitalization.**^ In

would eventually proceed

to utilize their resources

very effective tool was, in this respect, the so-called loans-

for-shares privatization scheme.

Masterminded by Potanin,

large stakes in Russia's companies

were

to

the

scheme advocated

that

be transferred to a small group of bankers on

highly favorable terms. Yeltsin instituted this privatization scheme in 1995, whereby the
class of

nouveaux riches businessmen agreed

return for shares.

The

transactions

were the

make

self-interest

loans to the "cash-starved" state in

result of behind-closed-doors negotiations.

rationale underlying this reform strategy

owners whose

To

Most

to

was

to create a class of property

would depend on the continued support of

the Yeltsin regime.

secure support for his reform policies President Yeltsin granted special "exemptions"

emergence has been described as comprising three stages: commercial, banking, and
industrial. See Sergei Markov. "Big Money's Origins: The Three Stages," Izvestia, Sept. 18, 1997, p.4,
translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.38, p.9f. See also Virginie
Its

as

Coulloudon. 2000. "The Divided Russian Elite: How Russia's Transition Produced a Counter-Elite," in
Building the Russian State, pp.67-87; Olga Krishtanovskaia and Stephen White. 1999. "From
Nomenklatura to New Elite," in The New Elite in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, pp.27-52; Ivan
Kukolev. 1999. "Formation of the Business Elite in Russia," in The New Elite in Post-Communist Eastern

Europe, pp.279-295.
For

details, see

Coulloudon, 2000, pp.69ff.

77

in

exchange for

loyalty.

To make

and economic reforms irreversible Yeltsin was

social

pleased to give out bargains to friendly bankers rather than to the
provincial industrialists

who
in

are backing the

Communist

respect through

this

the

Party. Culturally specified codes of governance

personalized nature of entitlement.

observers, analogies to the late czarist period

"fit

To some

emerge
political

perfectly well" in this context.'"

Violent Entrepreneurship. Certain institutional details of the political exchange

however,

situation,

call into

attitudinal orientation of

and

seeming

their

question

some of

readiness

its

cultural

modus. Conspicuous

in this regard is the

the financial-industrial elite vis-a-vis political authority

every

exploit

to

means

possible,

including

constitutional arrangements, to advance their agenda of self-enrichment.

As

conflicts of interest often bear the imprints of violent entrepreneurship.

officials

opposed

to oligarchic business interests ran the risk of

extra-

a corollary,

Government

becoming

targets of

organized violence.

Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, two key figures of the "second-generation
reforms" [see below, IMF],

exchange

situation.

were tasked

new

action

Appointed Deputy Prime Ministers

in

of the post-Soviet political

March 1997,

the reformers

to break with the unwritten rules of behind-the-scenes agreements. Part of the

strategy

(relatively)

illustrate the violent tendencies

was

to

make

sure that state assets

open and competitive

was the competitive bid

bids.

for

The

25%

would be

first

privatized within a

framework of

touchstone of this type of government

shares of Svyazinvest (Communications Invest

Telecommunications Company) on 25 July 1997. At the auction

itself,

two consortia were

Finance, Firms, Friends,
See, for example, Dinello, Natalia. 1999. "The Russian F-Connection.
pp.24-33.
Families, and Favorites," Problems of Post-Communism. January/February,
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competing, whereby the
defeating

his

Mustcom holding

competitor,

(Potanin interest) emerged as the winner

Berezovsky. Expectedly, the auction was surrounded
by

incidents of moderately belligerent exchanges. In a last-minute
appeal to Chubais,

Berezovsky reportedly
end, Berezovsky, in

Chubais

who was

tried

hard to avert the scenario of open competition.'*^

company with Potanin and Gusinsky, boarded

a plane to

this

meet

vacationing in France at the time. However, in opposition to their

demands, Chubais upheld the cause of the
that

To

whoever should

offer the largest

official agenda. Dissatisfied with the

formula

amount would win, Gusinsky and Berezovsky

reportedly went over to threaten Chubais with "media war."

Another ploy of the

Oligarchs was the possibility of taking purposeful actions to bring about the collapse of
Svyazinvest. In the aftermath of the bid, the defeated competitors

threat

and

theories"

initiated a large-scale

made

real their first

media campaign against Chubais. Multiple "conspiracy

were aired involving an allegedly

"strategic alliance"

between Chubais, Kokh

(Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Property Committee), and Potanin

outmaneuver the
fired

Kokh

promised

recalcitrant tycoons.

as "compensation" for those

that

to

In the end, Yeltsin eventually stepped in and

who

lost in the auction. In addition, Yeltsin

ONEKSIMbank would not participate

in the next Svyazinvest auction.

"^Andrei Bagrov. "Owners of ORT and NTV Lose First Battle," Kommersant-Daily, July 30,
1997, pp.lf, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.30, p.5.
For a detailed organizational chart see

"Who Controls

Russia's

News Media Outlets,"

Sevodnya, August 12, 1999, p.2, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51,
No.33,p.l4.

Over Russia,"
See, for instance, Ulyan Kerzonov. "Anatoly Chubais Seeks Complete Control

Nezavismaya Gazeta (Berezovsky

interest). Sept. 13, 1997, pp.1-6, as translated in

The Current Digest of

Behind Kremlin Walls,"
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.37, pp.1-5; Fyodor Fyodorov. "Bankers
Digest
of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49,
Kommerant-Daily, Sept. 16, 1997, p.l, as translated in The Current
No.37, p.5.
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Another case demonstrating the violent tendencies of the
new Oligarchy
provided by the Skuratov

affair, in

Spring of 1999. At that the time the Prosecutor

General, Skuratov was ousted from office while he was looking
into
transactions involving Aeroflot.

The events leading

to his dismissal

illegal financial

became

state-run television channels aired excerpts of videotape purporting
to

engaging in an extra-marital

affair.

According

events leading to the broadcasting of the tape
that

is

is

virulent

when

show Skuratov

to Skuratov’s understanding, the chain of

connected to the very circle of personages

he was investigating. In his statement to the Federation Council on 17 March 1999,

he indicated

that:

"A

by the oligarchs you

big contribution to the process of getting

are all familiar with,

who have

their

me

own

out of office was

made

interest in criminal cases

involving corruption in the highest echelons of power. The cases they are most interested
in

are the ones

AvtoVAZ

involving the Aeroflot airline

company [Berezovsky

the

[Volga Automotive Plant] joint-stock company, the Atoll private security

company [Berezovsky involvement] and

others."

The more immediate circumstances surrounding
reveal the uncompromising nature of the tactics of the

pursuit of wealth and political influence, the

utilize

interest],

new

forward linkages to crime and corruption.

new Kremlin

class of

To

the Skuratov-affair, however,

Oligarchy. In the

businessmen seems inchned

to

acquire incriminating evidence, the

Speech of the General Prosecutor in the Federation Council reprinted in Kommersant, March
Vol.51, No.l 1, p.lf.
18, 1999, p.6, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
ticket sales were channeled
from
moneys
that
indicated
have
Aeroflot
Investigations into the cash flows of
Lausanne,
an off-shore bank via complicate financial schemes involving the subsidiary Andava located in
private
out
carried
have
to
charged
is
company
Atoll
The
p.l44f.).
Switzerland {Der Spiegel, 1999, No.35,
See
family.
President
s
Russian
the
including
officials
government
surveillance activities on high-ranking
Berezovsky,"
against
evidence
incriminating
for
Sibneft
made
at
Leonid Berres and Oleg Stulov. "Search is
Vol.51, No.5,
Kommersant, Feb.3, 1999, p.l, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,

to

p.7.
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new

Oligarchy, as a corollary, obviously capitalizes on the
prevailing situation of

dysfunctional administrative state capacity.

The most distinguishing thing about
a great many examples in which,
policemen and prosecutors

oligarchic capitalism
at the

will begin

is the "privatization of power." I know of
wave of some magnate's hand, an army of regular

working feverishly

to dig

up

dirt

on

that magnate's rival or

Our law-enforcement agencies are so weak and impoverished that they are in
effect at the disposal not of bodies of power but of economic and media
"kings." Investigations of
high-profile contract murder proceed slowly and listlessly. But when it comes
to a competitive
struggle among businessmen, dozens of investigators go to work, turning everything
upside down
to satisfy some magnate's curiosity.^
political opponent.

Chronic problems of underpayment

law enforcement agents exchange
an informal basis.

engaged

It

in the administrative apparatus

their official duties with private protection

has been estimated that up to

in extra-legal

have the effect

"roof (krysha) business.^

20%

of

FSB

(former

KGB)

of private enforcers

that

recruits

administrative branches of government,

said

to

build

"enforcement

MVD

partnerships"

its

money on
cadres are

In his detailed analysis of various

agencies of violent entrepreneurship, Volkov demonstrates that there

industry

that

is

a growing

personnel from the power-wielding

and FSB.^^* Private security agencies are
at

times

with

semi-legal

entities

or

straightforward criminal groups. Criminal groups and state police cooperate to install a

"combined

roof."

As

a corollary, corrupt officials "reveal" violations of sanitary and other

Boris Nemtsov. "Russia’s Future.

-

Oligarchy or Democracy?" Nezavisimaya gazeta, March

The Current Digest, Vo.50, No.l 1, pp.1-5. See also, "I'm against a board of
directors for Russia." Interview with Anatoly Chubais conducted by Yevgenia Albats, Kommersant-Daily,
March 5, 1998, pp.1-5, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.l 1, pp.6-8.
17, 1998, p.8, as translated in

The Economist (28 August, 1999, p.l7) characterizes Krysha as a "straightforward commercial
security
arrangement, with payments, which may typically run to 10-20% of profits, invoiced monthly by a
company. The resulting protection is a hybrid of insurance, factoring, physical
friendly civil servant: good service costs more, but is more effective."

Vadim Volkov.

security, a

lawyer and a

1999. "Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia," Europe-Asia

Studies, Vol.51, No.5, p.74 1-754.
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codes on order from the Mafia. Entrepreneurial

entities without

face up to exorbitant taxes or inspection fees and the
like.

The

"roof protection then

joint enterprise of violent

entrepreneurship, however, has furthered the hollowing out
of the
represents the legitimate

monopoly of power. By

claim that

state’s

it

exploiting and maintaining a vacuum,

semi-legal collusion between corrupt officialdom, state police, and
criminal groups have

compromised any serious
In

effort

toward state-building.

view of such violent aspects

in state-business relations,

the post-Soviet banking and corporate elite

model of governance.

would

fit

it

seems unlikely

"perfectly" well in the

that

Romanov

Particularly troublesome in this respect has been the readiness of

the financial-industrial elite to exploit almost every

means possible

to

advance

agenda of self-enrichment, including the utihzation of forward hnkages

to

their

violent

entrepreneurship. Confronted with these semi-legal aspects of Russian entrepreneurship,

it

seems

futile to

of the company.

expect the

Au

new Oligarchy

to proffer input for the legal conceptualization

contraire, the situation suggests that the financial-industrial elite

continues to identify and pursue

its

interests

outside the conventional rule-of-law

framework. Certainly, the sanctity-of-law concept that penetrates much of the Western
business climate

is alien to this

IMF-Cooperation.
contingencies

emphasizes

of the

kind of support group.

Another

Yeltsin

essential

case

demonstrating

the

institutional

regime was MF-Russian cooperation. The analysis

in this respect the proximity

of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

relevant Russian policy-making authorities.

into a case of "intertwining" remains

Whether

open
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this

kind of cooperation evolved

to discussion since disagreement prevails

IMF

concerning the depth of
in this regard

involvement

in

Russian

affairs. Political inquiries vacillate

between notions of technical assistance and

political

advocacy.

In the field of privatization, Aslund, for instance,
argues that the role of foreign

advisors

was simply

provide technical support.

to

As Aslund

put

it:

"...the leading

Russian privatizers, Chubais and his deputy Dmitry Vasiliev, knew what
kind of policy
they wanted. They instructed their advisors about the policy framework, and
the advisors

were not permitted

to act as an interest group. Their job

was

to provide the

government

with useful advice within the parameters of the government policy."'^” Political studies,

on

the other hand, contend that the international institution,

beyond

its

conventional task

of macro-economic stabilization, got increasingly involved into the management of the

Russian economy.
visibility in

IMF
initiative to

To be

sure, a possible source for these diverging assessments is

low

IMF operations.
proximity, however, was conspicuous

apply for

full

application, the Russian

membership

when

the Yeltsin Presidency took the

in the international institution.

government invited foreign advice

To

expedite the

to participate in the drafting

of a detailed program on economic policy. The resulting framework conformed so well to

IMF

standards that

it

would eventually earn

the grade of "an

without financing" from one of the foreign advisors.

Aslund, Anders. 1995.

Brookings

Approved

IMF shadow program
in late February 1992,

How Russia Became a Market Economy. Washington, DC:

The

Institution.

Aslund, 1995, p.248.
See, for instance, Gould-Davis, Nigel

& Ngaire Woods.

International Affairs, Vol.75, No.l, pp.1-22.

Aslund, 1995, p.64.
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1999. "Russia and the IMF,

the

Economic Memorandum was

apphcation for
the

and

document

full

Fund

sent to the

in the

membership. Russian Government

"will

make

a

good impression on

become

that Russia will

a full

member of

hope

it

circles expressed their

the international

IMF

the

would expedite

their

hope

that

economic community

and the International Bank

for

Reconstruction and Development [The World Bank]."^^^
Evidently, the Russian government pinned high hopes on

Endemic
would

to this episode

was the idea

upon the

essentially hinge

to this reform calculus,

it

IMF membership.

that transition to a democratic

market economy

availability of foreign financial assistance.

became imperative

to

know what kind

According

of pohcy would meet the

sympathies of the international finance community. The Russian government would
therefore invite foreign

economic advice

to participate in the drafting of the

reform agenda to ensure agreement with western standards. The
the

Memorandum

bespeaks the delicate nature of

IMF

official presentation

involvement. Speaking

Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee, Michel Camdessus,

Managing
drafting.

Director,

"The

staff

was obviously taking pains
of the

IMF

memorandum. But allow me
credit for the successes

de-emphasize

IMF

at the

time

involvement

to insist

on one

point.

It is

failures."

Memorandum on Economic

their program.

He

They

of

1992

at the

IMF

in the

has assisted the Russian authorities in preparing

and the blame for the

"Russian Government

to

economic

this

will take the

then went on to explain: "The

Policy," Izvestia, February 28, 1992, pp.1-2,

as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.44, No.9, pp.1-4.

IMF
(1999) refer in this respect to the structure of incentives deriving from
nonbudget
by
state
the
finance
to
modus
assistance. IMF credits, it is noticed, provide an inexpensive
since successful negotiations
inflationary means. In addition, the institution's influence is highly leveraged
Bank, the London Club and
World
with
the
agreements
v^th the IMF are almost always a prerequisite for
Gould-Davis

et al.

the Paris Club.
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program has

to

be their program, backed by their commitment, supported
by their public

opinion."

Visibility of

design)

1995.

when

intent

upon thorough

on conditionality.
the Russian

proximity emerged aggressively (though not by intentional

the institution announced

The ultimate

conditional

IMF

To

was

its

support for "second-generation" reforms

to strengthen property rights

To

institutional changes.

strengthen

government entered

its

achieve

in

by making financial support
this,

the

IMF

put a

new

slant

commitment towards second generation reforms,

into special monitoring agreements with the Fund.

Monitoring of standby arrangements was to be conducted on a monthly rather than
quarterly

basis.

A

related

strategy

was

to

Commission on Strengthening Tax and Budget

institute

a

Temporary Extraordinary

Discipline [VChK].

Under

the aegis of

Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, the Commission was empowered to seize and
off the assets of tax debtors.

Such

actions,

and

IMF

sell

support for them, provoked a furious

response from the Oligarchs.

In

December 1997, when

off the property of

the

two

the

Commission decided

tax defaulters

-

the

Omsk

Angarsk Petro-chemicals Company — a new

strengthened efforts of revenue collection,

orchestrate a

Union

at

and subsequently

sell

Petroleum Refinery (Berezosky) and

tide of

the

to seize

"media war" erupted. To oppose

financial-industrial

media campaign against IMF involvement

in

elite

Russian business

decided to

affairs.

The

Michel Camdessus speaking to the Conference on the Economic Future of the Former Soviet
the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee, U.S. Department of State,

Washington, D.C. on June 15, reprinted

For

details see

Gould-Davis

IMF Press Release No.

in

IMF Survey,

6 July 1992, p.221.

et al., 1999, pp.l Iff.

95/21,

1 1

April 1995.
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most cynical
Its

first

articles

came from

page headline read:

Excerpts of

letters

from

the

Berezovsky-owned newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta.

"Why Does

Russia Need a Government of

IMF and World Bank to

its

Own?"*^*

the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin

were published, which convey the clear message

that the

Russian government would not

obtain any further assistance unless Chernomyrdin would "finalize"
the decisions of the

VChK.

Nezavisimaya gazeta commented on the IMFAVorldbank

initiative, to wit:

"Following the IMF's logic, the Russian Federation Cabinet of Ministers could
be
disbanded,

it

could be replaced by a small staff for monitoring the implementation of

Washington s decisions, and the [Russian] White House could be leased
firms. Everything

would be

easier for the budget." CapitaUzing on the

"Under

this

VChK

campaign. Koshkciryova and Narzikulov made

Nemtsov who

their

view

clear:

arrangement, there would no longer be any need for the two First Deputy

Prime Ministers, who deal with the economy. After
the

commercial

theme of wounded

national pride, the authors eventually went over to ridicule Chubais and

conducted the

to

all,

they are essentially duphcating

work of Messrs. Camdessus and Wolfensohn."^^^

To be

sure, Russia's

new

relationship with the

IMF was made

possible in part by

the strong insulated executive, which had been created by the 1993 constitution. During

Koshkaryova, Tatyana

Own?" Nezavisimaya

& Rustam Narzikulov.

"Why Does

Russia Need a Government of its

gazeta, Dec.18, 1997, pp.lf, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet

Press, Vol.49, No.51, pp.8f.

quoted to "recommend" that: "Before the meeting of the Board of Executive
number of measures in the form of preliminary conditions must be carried out. [...]
on Dec. 8, 1997, concerning
I attach enormous significance to the decisions made at the VChK's meeting
major defaulter enterprises. Those decisions are especially important if the government intends to show

Camdessus

is

Directors can be held, a

that it is serious about its efforts to collect taxes. Accordingly, the decisions should
be finalized immediately, made public, and then implemented fully, following a specific timetable.

major Russian taxpayers

Ibid.
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the course of negotiations, IMF-staff could reassure
itself of the feasibility of agreed-upon

terms of contract since the Russian Presidency could make
them legally effective by
resorting to

its

abundant decree powers. Parliamentary opposition to

on the other hand, could be simply vetoed. The

elitist

IMF

conditionality,

and essentially collusive nature of

such "cooperation" sparked criticism regarding the role of IMF-sponsored
economic
advice,

among

not only from

community

as well.

It is

theoretical basis, are

the

ranks of the Oligarchy but from the academic

criticized that

welcoming

economic advisors, operating on neo-classical

the concentration of political power, while ignoring the

long-term effects of such approach on capacity-building, and the concept of democratic
legitimacy in particular.

Assessing

IMF

staff

involvement

in

Russian legal reform, Kathryn Hendley comes

to the conclusion that:

Many

laws related to economic development, such as banking and securities

legislation,

have been

demanded not by Russian businessmen but by international financial institutions. In some
instances, the release of money from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund has been
linked to the passage of specific laws (Camdessus, 1996). In other cases, receiving technical
assistance for

framework

much-needed reforms has required the Russians indiscriminately

to

adopt a Western

for these reforms, rather them allowing Russian practice to dictate the shape of future

institutions (Aslund, 1995, p.247; Sharlet, 1997).'^^

See, also. Fish (2000, p.181),

"For their
were, as

is

own

who

argues

part, the foreign consultemts

normally the case

among

that;

who advised

the Russian government on economics

neoclassical economists, convinced of the virtues of concentrating,

Many felt that the concentration of power would fortify the forces most
minimize the dangers of 'gridlock,' and marginalize the bothersome
change,
economic
committed to rapid
a moribund economy."
restructuring
interference of 'politics' in
rather than dispersing, power.

Hendley, Kathryn. 1997. "Legal Development
Vol.l3, No.3, pp. 228-251, here at pp.238-240.
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in Post-Soviet Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs,

Corporate

Law Reform. 1992

1996

-

The process of corporate law reform confirms
transformative state capacity.

the Yeltsin regime

controls, as

was able

The
to

the outlined contingencies of

analysis confronts in this respect the circumstance that

engender popular support for the removal of Soviet-type

mandated by the reform concept of

"depoliticization," without, however,

securing intermediary agreements on the emerging legal framework.^” The
principle
objective of Russian privatization, as Shleifer and Vasiliev
rid

of the managers, but of the ministries.

effectively

move

its

summed

The inabihty of

it

up,

was not

to get

the Yeltsin regime to

reform agenda beyond the strategy of depoliticization so as to design

and implement a cohesive corporate governance regime

is

indicative of the proposed line

of reasoning.

Underlying reform failure was the predisposition of the Yeltsin Presidency
utilize various types

to

of emergency powers. Instead of going through a lengthy process of

building societal support, the Presidency would

more often

resort to Article

90

in order to

circumvent parliamentary opposition to his reform plans. Using his decree powers,
Yeltsin issued omnibus privatization decrees that

Depoliticization, as argued by

Boycko,

Shleifer,

would include aspects of company

and Vishny (1996)

refers to the reform strategy

management. To
of disenfranchising Soviet-type controls over the affairs of business and
types
of economic advice
dominant
implement depoliticization was considered imperative according to
industrial

since political influence over business

was considered

the prime cause for economic inefficiency.

on the other hand, and managerial discretion in
main
particular, were considered "clearly subordinate" to depoliticization (Boycko et al., 1996, p.l2). The
June
1
1
on
Yeltsin
law
by
into
policy tool of depoliticization was the 1992 Privatization Program. Signed
most of the large
1992, the Russian parliament passed a new privatization program designed to distribute
Institutional concerns of effective corporate governance,

state enterprises in eighteen

months, beginning in January 1993.

Andrei Shleifer and Dimitry Vasiliev. 1996. "Management Ownership and Russian
Privatization," in Corporate

Governance

in

Central Europe and Russia. Vol.2, pp. 62-77.
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law.

1

35

•

In addition, regulations related to corporate law materialized in the

orders or prohibitions: the President states what
corollary, the privatization decrees

relevant provisions.

The pertaining contingencies of

a formal point of view

is

were typically lengthy, making

firm became clearly visible for Pistor

From

or what

is

it is

who

observes

manner of

not to be done.

it

flat

As

a

difficult to locate the

the legal conceptualization of the

that:

worth noting that most normative acts pertaining

to privatization

or corporate law, issued since the introduction of economic reforms in 1992, were presidential
decrees. Their primary goal

was

to regulate specific aspects of the

reform process, without being

The latter is part of the basic
dilemma of the reform process. Even if the legislature had been willing to support reform, it would
have been unable to keep up with its pace. As a result, contradictions between new normative acts
and old laws would have been unavoidable under more favorable conditions. [...] The lack of
change in legal culture is also apparent in the style of normative acts passed. The majority of
norms reveal a systemic lack of appreciation of the importance of norm clarity and consistency.
necessarily consistent with each other, or with underlying legislation.

This tendency
little

is difficult to

attention to a rational

explain, unless

it is

seen as the continuation of a legal culture that paid

and predictable legal system.*^^

Kathryn Hendley, a distinguished

field researcher

of Russian company law, renders a

similar account:

The

technical problems of Russian law (including

can be a struggle

-

company law)

to say nothing of the difficulty of

are legion.

interpretation.

Merely finding the law

Laws

are often internally

contradictory or make cross-references to laws that either do not yet exist or do not say what the
to impatience with the
first law claims. The desire to make the market reforms irreversible has led
decrees.
executive
long debates within the legislature, and to a preference for

Deficiencies in

norm

consistency were eventually to compromise the reform agenda by

erecting entry barriers to outside shareholders.

Due

to the

1992 privatization regime,

Russian management disposed over a veto over corporate

For
in

details, see Pistor, Katharina. 1997.

The Rule of Law and Economic Reform
Pistor,

in

& Gray,

As Joseph

"Company Law and Corporate Governance

Russia, pp. 165- 187.

1997,pp.l75f.

Hendley

entry.

1997, p.l50.
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Blasi

in Russia,"

observed:

"When

the enterprises were privatized, the proof of share
ownership

share certificate but the record of the owner's

shareholder register.

if

If

make

start

a

an official book called the

in

your name was not there, you did not

an investor wanted to

director could

name

was not

own

stock. Period."'^* Thus,

accumulating shares of a particular company, the general

these intentions null and void by simply refusing to register

new

shareholders or not disclosing relevant information to interested parties. In addition, an

employee who wanted

own

to sell his

shares had to get management's approval before the

transaction could be registered.

Interim Period

During the interim period (1992-1996), incremental changes were made

company law whereby

was

attention

No. 2004). Despite these

largely focused

initiatives, the

"closely held secrets" continued.

tendency for most shareholder

registries to

their control

on shareholder

registers,

be

reported to

which further

the free selling and buying of shares. Preventing workers from selling,

compromised
or

privatization (Order No. 255 and

The majority of company managers were

have been very reluctant to relinquish

refusing

on

in

delaying

shareholders from the

Blasi,

registration

company

of shares

register,

acquired

by new owners, or erasing

were frequently reported.

Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse. 1997. Kremlin Capitalism: The
Russian Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, here at p.90.

Joseph R.,

Privatization of the

Ibid.
that a major
Thirty-six percent of voucher funds surveyed in the summer of 1994 report
Frydman et
see
registered,
not
are
shares
that
is
market
obstacle to share acquisitions on the secondary
example,
For
delayed.
been
often
has
registries
shareholder
the establishment of

al.

(1996) Moreover,

Gazprom completed voucher
established

its

auction at the end of June 1994.

shareholder register; see Pistor, 1997, p.l73.

90

By December 1994

the

company had

still

not

In response to such malpractice, a Presidential
Decree of October 1993 (Decree

No. 1768, 27 October 1993) sought

to address the problem.

detail the requirements for registering shares

despite the fact that

referring

to

the

all

and for providing

The decree

stipulated in

that the refusal to register,

necessary documents were submitted, could be challenged
by

company's revision commission or

companies with more than

1

filing

a

law

suit.

In

addition,

,000 shareholders were required to transfer their register to a

bank, investment company, or similar organization.

A

1995 survey of 3,400 of Russia's largest companies, however, revealed

that

44

percent of the companies with more than 1,000 shareholders had not surrendered control

over their shareholder

registers.^"^^

Moreover, these companies controlled many of the

broker or financing houses conducting shareholder registers on behalf of companies.
Additional entry barriers to outside ownership arose from the extensive catalog of
administrative requirements. In order to transfer shares, companies usually required a

complex

set

of documentation to be

filed,

which

in turn

needed to be

certified

by a

specially authorized firm with notary powers. Other requirements included, but were not

limited to, the presentation of a formal application by the

new

shareholder to open an

account, powers of attorney by the seller or buyer, as well as proof that taxes were paid on

the transaction.

the

The survey was conducted by the "Gruppa monitoringy fondovogo rynka (GMFR) attached
Russian Securities Commission (KZB), see Kommersant No.7, 28 February 1995, p.42, as quoted in

Pistor, 1997, p.l73.
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to

The 1996 Company Law

A more comprehensive approach developed only with the new Civil Code and the
new Law on
the

Law on

first

Joint-Stock Companies.

legal

regulations

in Russia's history.

on corporate law

privatization process.^'^^ President Yeltsin,

initiative,

1995, the Russian

Stock Companies that was put in force as of

comprehensive company law

patchwork

On 24 November

that

wary of

1

Duma

adopted

January 1996, making

The law

it

the

replaces most of the

had been enacted during the

the significance of the legal reform

obviously did not utilize Article 90 to fashion policy. Government officials

expressly resisted the "temptation" to put

decree.^'^^ Its drafting

extended over the

Societal Input.

Even though

its

main points

(likely) period

available data

into force

by presidential

of two years (1993-1995).

on bargaining

is

limited,

it

appears that

regionally based groups and Soviet-type organizations tried to influence policy design. In

the end, the governmental proposed framework, however, should prevail over

somewhat

fragmented domestic group pressures.
Provincial groups, for instance, are reported to have lobbied in favor of extending

the privileges of closed-type companies. Certainly, the continuation of this governance

type would have played in the hands of insider domination by effectively barring outside

The

first

part of the Civil

The second
March 1996.

into effect in January 1995.

1996) came into effect in

Code (Sobranie

zaknodatel'stva RF, no. 32,

part of the Civil

Code {Sobranie

art.

3301, 1994) came

zaknodatel'stva RF, no.5,

art.

410,

Karpenko, Igor. "Law for Stockholders," Izvestia, March 30, 1994, p.4, as translated in The
ViceCurrent Digest of Post-Soviet Press, Vol.46, No.l3, p.l5f. The article implicitly refers to First
not
importance
the
of
aware
well
Chairman of the State Property Committee Pyotr Mostovoi as having been
to use presidential decree

powers

for the enactment of the law.
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ownership.^^ The government
participants

m

draft,

on the other hand, proposed limiting the number
of

closed-type joint-stock companies in order to extend
the legal basis for

investment and technology transfer. Within the

final stages of the drafting process the

region-based group demands would eventually acquiesce into government
policy. Notice
is

taken

that:

"In the end, everyone agreed with the

stockholders in a closed-type

company should be

government

governmental discretion

government

officials

collectivities.

in

it

would be wrong

designing policy was beyond reproach.

would have

to

number of

limited...''^'^^

Despite such spontaneous cases of policy alignment,
that

that the

to believe

To

be sure,

deal with the likely opposition of Soviet-type

Available data suggests that concessions were

made

regarding policy

pressures from communist-based and agrarian organizations.*'^^

Agrarian groups reportedly lobbied for special arrangements regarding the legal
status of recently reorganized state

most opposition-minded group,"

would allow them continued
final

draft

and collective farms. Positioning themselves

agricultural producers

as "the

were looking for amendments

state funding. Apparently, their voices

that

had been heard. The

eventually extended special jurisdiction for agricultural entities without,

however, encroaching upon the main principles of corporate law reform. Similar

Ivanov, Viktor

& Boris Boiko.

"Saga of the

Law on

Joint-Stock Companies Has

Come

to

an

End," Kommersant-Daily, November 25, 1995, p.2, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, Vol.47, No.47, p.20. The article lists the Voronezh Province Duma as the official protagonist of this
type of demand.

The

authors, furthermore, refer to the vested interests of the regional military-industrial

complex.
Ibid.

See supra note; see also Natalya Samoilova. "Privatization of State Property: State Duma
Current
Tightens Control. But Cautiously," Kommersant-Daily, July 6, 1995, p.2, as translated in The
p.l4.
No.27,
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.47,
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tendencies

prevailed

amendments regarding
this issue, the

(i.e.

assets

regarding

communist-based

demands

sought

to

make

issues of authorized charter capital. Encountering
opposition on

government dropped the idea of introducing the

minus

that

liabilities) as

principle of "fund balance"

advocated by western standards.

Thus, even though available data

is

suggestive of societal resistance,

noted that the particularistic nature of politically articulated

interests

it

should be

would not amount

to

a broad-based opposition to government policy. Instead, their main concern was
to

demand exemptions
state

autonomy

is

to the rule, not to establish a coherent policy alternative. Indicative of

the circumstance that legal output

would conform

to the principled

purpose of reform, namely to introduce a corporate governance regime fashioned upon
western concepts of norm consistency and legal protection of minority shareholder
Foreign Economic Advice. In

its

push for corporate law reform, the government

would eventually draw upon western sources of
that the

government-sponsored reform

rights.

bill

expertise. Legal

commentary

indicates

represents a modified version of a draft

designed by two American corporate law professors, Bernhard Black and Reiner

Kraakman. The professors themselves came forward
novel approach of the law.

a

model

statute for the

to publish an article explaining the

In their article, the authors indicate that they helped to draft

Russian Federation, which formed "the basis for the recently

adopted Russian law on joint-stock companies."*^* This assessment conforms

to the

normative substance of the law. As advocated by Black and Kraakman, the Russian

See Bernhard Black & Reiner Kraakman. 1996. "A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,"
109 Harvard Law Review, pp. 191 1-1982.

make a reference to Anna Stanislavovna
law. Black et al. 1996, p. 1912.
company
Russian

In their acknowledgments, the authors, however,

Tarassova as "the principal Russian drafter of the
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Company Law

offers legal protection of minority shareholder
rights and participation in

the governance of the corporation.

Toward

this end,

major points of the law include;

cumulative voting by shareholders to elect the board of directors;

(1)

(2) extensive procedural

protections for shareholders over the board;
(3) a requirement for the use of independent
registrars; (4) disclosure

and

(5)

of a company's financial records and other relevant information;

mandatory board and shareholder oversight over classes of

large-scale and self-

interested transactions.

Regarding entry and exit options, the 1996 corporate law guarantees the
shareholders in an open stock

company

to sell their shares freely. Again, a valid transfer

of shares requires registration in the company

register.

regulations, the law attempts to reduce control by

Furthermore, similar to previous

company

insiders over the register

more than 500 shareholders must

establishing that companies with

right of

of the register to a special registry. In view of the

difficulties

transfer

by

management

many newly incoming

shareholders had had with registering their shares, the law provides that registration must

be conducted within three days

after the necessary

that the registration requirements

documents

are submitted. In the event

have not been met, the company must issue a written

explanation for the rejection within five days after the request for registration

submitted.

A

shareholder

may

challenge in court a decision to refuse to register his

shares.

Reform

in

For a discussion of the law, see Gregory Wolk. 1999. "Comment: Corporate Governance
Russia: The Effectiveness of the 1996 Russian Company Law," Pacific Rim Law & Policy
19-240; Natasha Ziabkina. 1999. "Rights of Shareholders in Russia: Assessing Recent Legal

Journal, pp.2

Developments," International

is

Law and Politics,

Vol.30, pp. 369-396.
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Corporate Governance in the

The empirical

situation of corporate

management

discretion. General directors have

control,

against

as

management

rank-and-file

patterns

become

Russia

governance

suggestive of Soviet-type

is

been quite successful

employees

visible

New

and

outsider

in holding onto their

influences.*^”

Persisting

the nature of voting procedures, executive

in

decision-making, and the resolution of ownership claims.
In the governance of entry options,

over

who buys

independent

their shares.

managers have continued to exert

Circumventing the law, most companies

shareholder registers;

and most managers

say

they

tight control

in fact

do not use

oppose financial

disclosure and majority ownership by an outside investor with enough capital to turn the

firm around.

A

"favorite tactic" of

management

to counter outside

the dilution of stock.*^* Dilution of stock denotes the circumstance

to "insiders,"

facilitate

meaning

these

enterprise

managers and employees,

insider-acquisitions,

allowed to delay payment for shares
practically zero.

ownership

is

is

TTie

prices.

members

this

maneuver

for

is to

1996; Blasi et

Most of the surveys conducted on ovmership

encroach upon the power of

discretion

since

employee

to organizational overlaps of the Soviet

al.,

1997; Pistor, 1997; Hendley, 1997.

results

from privatization estimated insider
be between 65% and 70%.

all shareholdings in privatized firms to

96

are

152

management

Due

staff

Economist July 24, 1999, p.64.

shareholdings as a percentage of

To

of inflation has reduced the price to

protective of the status quo.

al.,

below market

until the rate

essential

See, for example, Shleifer et

shares are issued

employees and

The ultimate goal of

domination

when

in

cash-starved

outside shareholders while increasing those of insiders.

Insider

at

ownership consists

Trade regime, labor unions continue to be weakly
organized and inexperienced
exercise of workers rights. Another reason

is

fear of losing their jobs if they

in the

would

attempt to vote against management in shareholders
meetings. Yet another key for

management

discretion

is

the historical respect for the head official. Challenging
the

general director seems an unlikely insider strategy for collectivities
that have been

exposed

to

decades of Soviet-style edinonachalie. As Kathryn Hendley observes

in her

in-depth study of the Saratov Aviation Plant: "Their instinct was to obey orders, not
to

question their legitimacy.

As

a strategy, corporate executives capitalize on the risks associated with liberal

types of entrepreneurship in order to mobilize consent from labor collectivities. Talking
in front of their workers, directors

have repeatedly conjured up the image of an

hostile

environment, composed of organized crime and foreign investors, ready to launch a
hostile

take-over of their business. Argumentative formulas, such

government

likes

it

as,

"whether the

or not, the privatization program will be beneficial only to foreign

business and domestic shadow business" characterize such arguments.

Related surveys on enterprise behavior confirm that Russian corporate directors

espouse an ambivalent attitude towards the involvement of foreign investors in the

conduct of business

affairs.

Russian managers oppose outside minority shareholders

Hendley, Kathryn. 1998. "Struggling to Survive:
Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.50, No.l, pp.91-119.

A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian

Tatyana Koryagina, a former colleague of Gaidar who would later become a key economic
advisor to Gennady A. Zyuganov quoted in Joseph Blasi et al., 1997, p.46.
96-104; 1998 Russia: Country Commercial Guide, pp.24-27;
in
Macmillan, Carl H. 1996. "Foreign Investment in Russia: Soviet Legacies and Post-Soviet Prospects,"
65f.
at
here
pp.
States,
pp.41-73,
Foreign Investment in Russia and Other Soviet Successor

See Joseph Blasi

et al., 1997, pp.
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even

if

they would bring an inflow of capital and technological know-how
necessary to

modernize enterprises: "Yes,
in return for our shares.

We

we need

investments, but

we would

never agree to get them

don't need anything outside shareholders have to offer.

have not given our share register to an independent

registrar

We

and we're simply not going

to."i'^

Summarizing

his research

on corporate governance

in Russia,

Joseph Blasi came

to the following assessment:

1996 we gave all Russian corporations corporate governance scores based on the number of
on their boards, cumulative voting, the use of independent shareholder registrars, the
degree to which owners of concentrated blocks of stock (over 5 percent of shares) had board seats
in proportion to ownership, and maneuvering to keep new share issues and stock buybacks within
the firm. Thirteen percent of companies engaged in bad practices so systematically that their
corporate governance was graded so horrible; 46 percent received bad corporate governance
grades; and 39 percent, who engaged in only one or two questionable practices among generally
good ones, were graded as good. Two percent of the companies received excellent scores. This is
not encouraging news, since even those companies with reputations for good corporate governance

In

outsiders

engaged

More

in at least

one practice that might make a serious outside investor think twice.

recent trends in corporate Russia seem to indicate a change towards more

many

transparency. In July 1999 The Economist noted that

abuses are becoming rarer

thanks to more rigorous enforcement of stock market rules by Russia's securities and

exchange commission (SEC). The

article

went on

to argue that, "Russian

company
158

registrars

can no longer simply delete the names of shareholders they

Especially larger companies are seen to be

mechanism

moving

to protect shareholder rights in the

Quoted

in Blasi et al., 1997, p.l03.

Blasi et

al.,

1997,p.l01.

The Economist, July 24, 1999, p.64.
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to

comply with

hopes of

dislike.

the law as a default

attracting foreign investment.

SIDANCO,

Insiders at

a Russian oil

company,

for example, agreed to offer minority

shareholders "equal access" to bonds that had been previously diluted.
offer

of

came

after

SIDANCO,

To be

sure, the

aggrieved shareholders called upon the SEC. Vladimir Potanin,
director

purportedly

commented on

the former deal that in Russia today

"it is

not

possible not to respect shareholder rights.

The convoluted

style

of Potnanin's statement seems conspicuous

in reflecting

persistent features of ambiguity in the governance of Russian business affairs. Firms

interested in attracting foreign direct investment are likely to

company

comply with

the 1996

law, while smaller business entities continue to hold on to their accustomed

way

of doing business. As a tendency, managers seem willing to comply only when they
realize they

need outside money. According

be splitting into two

tiers

to field research. Corporate Russia appears to

of corporate governance. The

first tier is

concerned with

attracting investments

and exhibits "no major corporate governance challenges."

The second seeks

remain closed and works with closely

to

affiliated

"banks or trade

suppliers."

The aforementioned assessment corresponds with more
development
tectonic

rift

general

streams

of

in state-business relations. Observers note that Russia is undergoing a

in socio-political

exchanges between center (Moscow

Chrysta Freeland. "Shareholders

Win Russian Bond

Fight," Financial

&

St.

Petersburg) and

Times (London),

February 26, 1998, p.2.
(containing excerpts from
Paula Hawkins. 1997. "Salomon Gets Serious," 7 Central Eur, pp.44f
Bros.), as quoted in
Salomon
with
an interview with Jim Dannis, Managing Director for Emerging Markets

Gregory Wolk, 1999, p.235.
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periphery

Economic

seems

that

to

recapitulate

culturally

determined

cleavage

formation.’^’

entities located at the periphery, or with an ideological
outlook diverging

that of the center,

seem inclined

circumvent the rules of

to

Soviet-type trading regimes in order to

utilize

To

Russia.

official'

from

erect entry barriers to outside control,

general directors rely on personalized exchange patterns established in Soviet
times.

Decentralized

networks of trusting business partners take the shape of financial-

industrial-groups

enterprises,

it

(FIGs)

and barter

1996 survey of 1670

cartels.

industrial

has been revealed that 42 percent of trade was through non-monetary

exchange, including barter and payment in various forms of negotiable instruments.

Russian CEO's prefer and adopt such trading networks, even when monetary funds are
available. This business strategy

seems

irrational

impose a 100 percent surcharge on transaction
its

concentration power, emerges as the

foreign direct investment (FDI)

up

is

new

costs.

because the complexities of barter

Moscow, on

the other hand, with

capital of Russian-style capitalism.

indicative of center-periphery cleavage.

The

Data on

city

makes

six percent of Russia's population, but attracts two-thirds of FDI. All leading Russian

See, for example, Hendley, Kathryn

& Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman.

1997. "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.l3, No.l, pp.l941; Dinello (1999).
Financial-industrial-Groups represent alliances
that are connected through interlocking share holding

among commercial and

industrial enterprises

and directorates organized along

the lines of

production chains.

Hendley

Some

& Ickes et

al.,

1997.

money-based
researchers estimate that barter entails 100 percent surcharge vis-a-vis

transactions; for details see

Hendley

et al., 1997, p.34.
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banks, the main beneficiaries of privatization, are
Moscow-based;
leading banks in January 1998 only two were located elsewhere.’^

See, for example, Dinello, 1999, p.28.
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among

the thirty

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
To draw

a tentative conclusion, the present study demonstrates
that post-Soviet

reform politics have been shaped by culturally specified contingencies.
To assess the
degree of institutional contingency, the inquiry (1) carved out the institutional
bases
pertaining to coordination and control of economic reform and
(2) contextualized the
specified variables with empirical settings of corporate law reform.

The

analysis (3)

established in this regard a correlation between the variables of institutional arrangement

and

transformative

The

capacity.

resulting

matrix

consequences of corporate law reform bespeaks in

low transformative

AD
emerged
politics.

1

To

intended

this context a

and

unintended

circumstance of endemic

capacity.

In accordance with the historic model, the executive branch of government

to exercise

would make
interest

:

of

tight discretion

over the institutional underpinnings of reform

ensure heightened autonomy in policy design, the presidential apparatus

strategic institutional choices to insulate

structure.

Insularity of

government agency extended over both

dimensions of government, inter-branch and
Inter-branch relations.

To

government agency from

all

societal

institutional

state-societal.

appearances, Boris Yeltsin stands in the current of

czarist traditions, able to condition the process of constitutional politics to his personal

advantage. The 1993 constitution, composed under his auspices, confers abundant powers

to the Presidency, allowing for the

push for reform, the Yeltsin regime

merging of

legislative

and executive powers. In

institutionalized an operational

framework

that

its

would

Duma. Recurrent
diminish the role of democratically elected representatives to the State
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episodes of government reshuffling and the invocations
of constitutional
the scope for political maneuvering and tactical

Czanst times, furthermore,

is

moves of

crisis

bespeak

the Presidency. Reminiscent of

the organizational design and status of the
presidential

bureaucracy. Exceeding by far the scope of other government
agencies, the Executive
Office

is

of central importance for the internal relations of coordination
and control.

Its

operational competence has been credited to be of central importance to the
coordination

of legislative

activity. In

conjunction with the State-Legal Administration,

a gatekeeper within the field of legislation.

was accorded

to the State

Under

Romanov

the

it is

considered

dynasty, a similar role

Chancery working under the auspices of the Imperial

State

Council.

State-Societal Linkages. In addition, the presidential apparatus

autonomy from

societal pressures

by exerting

tight, if

not to say manipulative, control

over the organizational design of participation and societal interaction
exchanges.

To maximize

in state-business

control over policy choice, the Yeltsin Presidency disrupted the

established framework of state-industrial linkages and forged

primarily on personal discretion.

powers

would ensure

To

this end, Yeltsin

new

coalitions based

could make use of his presidential

to reshape and condition societal access points. Instrumental to this cause

was

his

decision to disenfranchise and undercut Soviet-type mass-base organizations and to grant

particularistic entitlements for access

favorites.

Due

to

Yeltsinite

and bargaining

discretion,

to a

emerging

network of personal friends and

state-business

linkages

manifest

organizational strains of volatility, selectivity, and informality. The analysis referred in

this context to the delicate

that revolved

web of

"court politics" and extra-constitutional arrangements

around the Yeltsin family.
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The new Kremlin Oligarchy:
a

highly

Oligarchy.

leveraged

Presidential discretion

group of financial-industrial

The preceding paragraphs

particularistic

exchange

relation.

was instrumental

entrepreneurs,

the

in the rise

of

new Kremlin

illustrated in this regard the political
calculus of this

Based on

traditional concepts of loyalty, Yeltsin

was

pleased to extend bargains to friendly bankers rather than
to the provincial industrialists

who

are backing the

Communist

loans-for-shares privatization

rules,

Party. This type of political

scheme

instituted in 1995.

To

exchange peaked with the
grant special privatization

and exemptions from the general laws, Yeltsin made consistent use of

presidential decree powers.

owners whose

self-interest

The underlying

would depend on

rationale

was

his

to create a class of property

the continued support of the Yeltsin regime.

Culturally specified governance codes emerged in this respect through the personalized

nature of entitlement.

The

analysis,

particularistic

however, also

tried

to

exchange modus with respect

underline the negative aspects of this

to concerns of social legitimacy and political

culture. Proximity of this oligarchic type of support group to political authority turned out

to

be disastrous for

contrast to

its

state capacity

historic predecessors, the

insignia of political authority

Instead, the class of

exploit every

and the conduct of an effective economic

means

when

new group of

their

policy. In

Oligarchs would not bend to the

immediate business

nouveaux riches businessmen made

it

interests

were involved.

very clear that they would

possible, including extra-constitutional arrangements, to advance

their interests. Multiple series of

"media wars" demonstrated

their inclination not to

support government policy and to openly resist authoritative action.
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Resistance to government authority emerged more aggressively
to strengthened efforts of revenue collection.

new

Under

in its

opposition

the lead of Boris Berezovsky, the

business elite would launch a media campaign to ridicule government cooperation

with the international institution of the IMF. Capitalizing on the theme of wounded
national pride,

the published press

involvement into the

affairs

Oligarchy would ignore
basic fact that their

its

own

institutional contingency.

involvement in Russian

articles

would question

the legitimacy of

IMF

of Russian reform politics. At the same time, however, the

commonality with the
to

rise

international institution,

power was made possible through

namely

the

the criticized

Both oligarchic self-enrichment and evolving patterns of IMF
affairs

were conditional upon the

of

feature

institutional

heightened insularity. Deriving from internal system features, the Presidency had the

strategic

option

to

allocate

and

reshape

bargaining

positions

based

on

tactical

considerations.

AD

2:

The organizational complexities involved

insulated government agencies

reform.

When

the utilization of highly

clearly visible in connection with corporate law

the government took the initiative to strengthen the property rights of

minority shareholders,

social

became

in

behaviors

it

became evident how

without

a

set

preceding section highlighted in

difficult

it

would be

of complementary institutional

this respect the varieties

to

change embedded

arrangements.

The

of Soviet-type continuities

in

executive decision-making, and
the affairs of corporate governance. Voting procedures,

of Soviet-type
the resolution of ownership claims bespeak the persistence

discretion.

As

management

domestic general directors
a corollary, the current situation suggests that

have the freedom of choice on whether or not
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to

comply with

the

1996

legislation.

According

to available data,

they need outside money.

On

managers are willing

to

comply only when they

the basis of the presented material, however,

it

realize that

seems

fairly

reasonable to argue that even the influx of outside investment
capital does not guarantee

compliance. Recurrent cases of share dilution have made

have been very reluctant
these developments

is

it

clear that Russian

to adapt to western standards of business conduct.

that general directors

managers

Common

have quite successfully maintained the

to

status

quo. The pertinent research literature emphasizes the phenomenon of insider-domination.
In addition,

strong

emerging patterns of center-periphery cleavages provide another

of low

indicator

undergoing a tectonic

rift

transformative

capacity.

Corporate Russia appears

in socio-political exchanges.

Economic

to

be

entities located at the

periphery, or with an ideological outlook diverging from that of the center,

inclined to utilize Soviet-type trading regimes. Indicative of this tendency

is

seem more

the structure

of FDI and the mushrooming of barter cartels organized along Soviet lines of production
chains. Russia, consequently, runs the risk of having

the

Moscow-based

centralized

to-riches businessmen,

Kremlin's 'inner

governance

interests involving the

on the one hand, and decentralized

circle,'

structures

economic

two opposing realms of governance,

on the

other.

The developing

and realms of influence bears

new Oligarchy of come-

actors without access to the

patterns of

in

this

two disassociated

context

stunning

a

resemblance to Robert Tucker's paradigmatic conception of Russia as a dual cultural

entity.

AD
embedded
relations.

3:

The presented

materials

demonstrate that regime failure

to

change

state-societal
social behaviors is connected to the organizational design of

Low

organizational density and executive branch domination of societal input
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options have certainly

left their

mark on

the sociological field of

economic reform. The

data of unintended consequences of reform policy bespeaks
an organizational dearth of

information exchanges and guidance in understanding reform policy.
The fact that
corporate executives are in a position to mobilize worker collectivities to act
against their

own

self-interests

by not observing

their legal rights in the

underscores such reasoning. Particularly troublesome

managers are evidently able

Such conditions

to capitalize

on

is

governance of the corporation
the

phenomenon

that

Russian

culturally established fears of xenophobia.

certainly underscore the issue of information dearth because the legal

clause of minority shareholder protection, as stipulated under the 1996 legislation,

is

designed to serve equally the needs of worker collectivities and any outside investors
(domestic or foreign).

To be

sure,

under current conditions

it

seems

insider-controlled firms to question the legitimacy of reform policy.

The

the Presidency with a network of personal friends and favorites, the

fairly

easy for

intertwining of

new Kremlin

Oligarchy, which itself does not appear inclined to comply with the general legislation of

economic reform

policy,

is

certainly not helpful in inducing a change at the political and

regional periphery. In addition, the fact that the Russian government was, to a certain

extent, dependent

upon foreign economic advice

hands of resisting sociological
rejected the

simply as

new

structures.

in shaping policy also plays into the

Accordingly, business collectivities have

legislation because of culturally determined concerns, or interpret

new machinations

it

of the power center. The provision of an acceptable

concerns.
alternative to traditional Russian-style transformation could have lessened these
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